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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Communication in Collective Choice Environments
by
Keith E. Schnakenberg
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science
Washington University in St. Louis, 2014
Professor Elizabeth Penn, Chair
In this dissertation, I present three models of communication in collective choice environ-
ments. The first two models demonstrate how collective choice procedures provide oppor-
tunities for informed communicators to manipulate outcomes by strategically obfuscating
information to appeal to different coalitions at different times. Paradoxically, the members
of the collective choice institution are often better off gathering no information at all rather
than relying on an expert who manipulates outcomes in this way. The final chapter char-
acterizes the incentives of candidates to reveal information about their preferences to voters
in an election when multiple policy issues are at stake. I show that candidates can credibly
reveal directional information about their preferences but will leave the voters uncertain
about which candidate is more extreme.
ix
Chapter 1
Preface
Communication and collective choice are central problems faced in political environments.
Communication is necessary when some individuals possess information that is relevant to
a choice that must be made by another individual or set of individuals. Since the seminal
model of strategic information transmission by Crawford and Sobel (1982), social scientists
have understood that successful communication is difficult when the parties involved have
conflicting preferences about the choices to be made. Conflicting preferences are a distin-
guishing feature of politics, so communication problems abound in political environments.
Collective choice – that is, the process of combining individuals’ preferences or actions into
a single choice for all of society – is another key feature of political institutions. Like com-
munication, collective choice is difficult in the face of diverse preferences. The theorem of
Schofield (1983) showed that, when there are multiple divisible issues at stake, there is gener-
ically no policy that would beat every other policy in a majority vote. Thus, the collective
choice problem under majority rule is difficult in the sense that the rule does not prescribe
any unambiguous “best” choice. This is known as the problem of collective choice cycles
and it extends to many voting rules other than majority rule (Nakamura, 1979). Though
both problems are well established and central to theories of politics, communication and
collective choice have rarely been analyzed together.
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In this dissertation, I present three models of communication in collective choice settings.
In the first, I provide a general theory of information transmission by a single expert to a
collective choice body. In the model, the policy-motivated expert has private information
on the effect of a policy proposal and communicates to a set of voters prior to a vote
over whether or not to implement the proposal. In contrast to previous game-theoretic
models of information transmission, the results apply to situations involving multiple voters,
multidimensional policy spaces and a broad class of voting rules. The results highlight
how experts can use information to manipulate collective choices to the detriment of all
of the voters. Opportunities for expert manipulation are the result of collective choice
instability: all voting rules that allow collective preference cycles also allow welfare-reducing
manipulative persuasion by an expert.
The second model in this dissertation applies similar insights about manipulative persuasion
to a model of lobbying. Lobbyists play the role of the experts in this model, but the main dis-
tinguishing feature of the model compared to the first is the fact that two lobbyists compete
for the votes of the legislators. Though interest groups gain influence by building coalitions
between legislators with diverse goals and interests, political scientists’ theories of interest
group influence were previously built around models of communication to a single legislator.
In contrast, I account for the special incentives that voting institutions provide for lobbyists
to manipulate voting coalitions to their advantage. Even more than in the first model, this
form of lobbyist manipulation has stark implications for legislator welfare: if interest group
influence exists then it always has a negative effect on welfare. Competition between interest
groups may help eliminate this negative effect but only for certain policy areas. In particular,
interest group competition blocks the influence of interest groups advocating very targeted
policies but has no effect if the policy area is sufficiently broad. The results suggests that
2
interest group scholars should pay attention to the ways in which lobbyists use collective
choice institutions to their advantage.
The final model is one of campaign communication in a two-candidate majority rule election
with multidimensional policies. Candidate and voter preferences are private information and
campaigns consist of both candidates sending cheap talk messages in order to communica-
tion information about their preferences. The game always possesses equilibria involving
informative campaign messages. Campaign communications reveal information about the
directions of the candidates’ ideal points from the center of the policy space but leave the
voters uncertain about which candidate is more extreme. There is always an equilibrium in
which both candidates reveal whether they are left or right of the median on issue dimen-
sions corresponding to the principal components of the preference distribution. Furthermore,
if the distribution of candidates’ ideal points is spherically symmetric then there exists an
equilibrium in which the candidates fully reveal the direction of their ideal point from the
center.
Together, these three models demonstrate that communicators have very different incentives
when transmitting information to collective choice bodies rather than single decision-makers.
The fact that many different coalitions may form in order to determine a collective choice
increases the power of a communicator by expanding the set of persuasive appeals that help
achieve the communicator’s preferred outcome. In some cases this additional power works
to the disadvantage of the members of the collective choice body.
3
Chapter 2
Expert Advice to a Voting Body
Expertise is at least as important as formal decision-making authority as a source of political
power in many institutions. As a result, formal models of communication under asymmet-
ric information have improved our understanding of topics such as legislative committees
(Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1987, 1989, 1990), lobbying (Grossman and Helpman, 2001), and
information acquisition by voters (Lupia and McCubbins, 1998). These models feature a key
insight from the seminal Crawford and Sobel (1982) model: though more communication
would lead to better policies, the expert faces incentives to obfuscate when her preferences
diverge from the policy-maker’s. Institutions, therefore, are posed as solutions to the prob-
lem of extracting the maximum amount of information from the expert. As Hirsch and
Shotts (2012) noted, “uncertainty reduction, expertise, and the common good have become
essentially synonymous, regardless of whether the empirical domain is institutional design,
lobbying, or delegation.”
Though the role of information is most pronounced in complex and multifaceted policy
domains, the prevailing wisdom about communication in political institutions is built on
models in which policy-making is one-dimensional. One-dimensional models excel at par-
simony because they reduce the problem of communicating with a voting body to one of
communicating with a single representative voter or legislator. This parsimony comes at the
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cost of generality because representative voters are unlikely to exist in multidimensional pol-
icy domains. In two or more dimensions, majority rule is known to be unstable in the sense
that all policies can be beaten by some other policy (Schofield, 1983). Furthermore, this in-
stability property extends beyond majority rule to a wide variety of voting rules (Nakamura,
1979). Though it is known that instability makes voting bodies subject to manipulation in
other contexts (McKelvey, 1976; Riker, 1986), the implications of collective choice instability
for information transmission are not well established.
In this paper, I present a model in which a policy-motivated expert has private information
concerning the substantive effect of a multidimensional policy proposal under consideration
by a set of voters. The expert sends a costless (“cheap talk”) public message concerning the
effect of the policy proposal. After seeing the expert’s message, the voters take an up-or-
down vote over whether to implement the new policy or retain the status quo. In contrast
to standard accounts of communication in political institutions, information transmission
from the expert to the voters may be ex ante detrimental to voter welfare. Welfare losses
from information transmission result from a form of political manipulation by the expert in
which information is presented in a way that exploits collective preference cycles. In fact, the
phenomenon of manipulative persuasion is connected to collective preference instability in a
precise way: all voting rules that permit collective choice instability also permit manipulative
persuasion.
Example 1. To illustrate the logic of manipulative persuasion, consider the following ex-
ample. A lobbyist wants to persuade a majority of a three-member legislative committee to
approve a public project. The legislators’ districts are labeled A, B, and C. The project will
cost each legislator’s district $100 and provide a benefit bi of uncertain size to each district.
There are four possible effects of the policy, which the legislators initially believe are equally
5
likely. The project may have an equitable effect, in which case it provides a good valued
at $105 to all districts. Alternatively, the policy may have a provincial effect, and provide
a good valued at $250 to one of the three districts. These four states and their resulting
benefits are below:
Policy state bA bB bC
Equitable 105 105 105
Provincial A 250 0 0
Provincial B 0 250 0
Provincial C 0 0 250
Each legislator prefers to approve the proposal if the expected benefit to that legislator’s
district is greater than the $100 cost. The lobbyist receives a payoff of zero if the proposal
fails and some positive payoff if the proposal is passed. The lobbyist, who knows the effect of
the policy, can advise the legislators in the form of a public speech revealing some information
about the policy state.
What type of speech should the lobbyist make in each situation? If the legislators held a
vote prior to listening to the lobbyists’ speech, each legislator’s expected payoff from passing
the proposal would be $355/4, which is less than the cost of $100, so the proposal would
fail unanimously. In fact, there is an equilibrium with no information transmission since, if
legislators assume that all speeches are uninformative and vote in this fashion, the lobbyist
cannot affect the chosen policy and therefore receives the same payoff from any message.
Next, suppose for the sake of argument that the lobbyist revealed all information to the
legislators. Then the proposal would pass unanimously in the equitable state and fail in a
2-1 vote in every other state. However, if the legislators are persuaded to pass the proposal
6
Policy state Message Frequency
Equitable {e} 100%
Provincial A
{a, b} 50%
{a, c} 50%
Provincial B
{a, b} 50%
{b, c} 50%
Provincial C
{a, c} 50%
{b, c} 50%
Table 2.1: An equilibrium communication strategy for the game in Example 1.
when the lobbyist makes a speech implying that the policy is equitable, then the lobbyist
has an incentive to make that same speech for other policy states, so it is not an equilibrium
for the lobbyist to reveal all information.
Instead, suppose that the lobbyist gives a series of speeches with slightly less information
content. Let the set of possible speeches be represented by subsets of the set {e, a, b, c}, so
that the speech {e} is interpreted as “The policy is equitable”, {b} is interpreted as “District
B is the sole beneficiary of the policy”, {a, c} is interpreted as “The sole beneficiary of the
project is either District A or District C”, and so on. Consider the communication strategy
in Table 2.1. Here, the lobbyist always reveals when the policy effect is equitable. The
lobbyist uses mixed strategies for the other policy states. For instance, half of the time
that the lobbyist learns that District A is the sole beneficiary of the project, she gives a
speech meaning “the sole beneficiary of the project is either District A or District B” and
the other half of the time she gives the same speech, where “B” is replaced with “C.”
A similar strategy is used for the other provincial policy states. When the lobbyist uses
this strategy, the legislators are always persuaded by a speech claiming that the policy is
equitable. Furthermore, when the lobbyist sends the message {a, b}, the posterior probability
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that the policy state is “Provincial A” is
1
4
· 1
2
1
4
· 1
2
+ 1
4
· 1
2
=
1
2
,
with the other 1
2
probability concentrated on “Provincial B.” Thus, legislators A and B each
have an expected payoff of $250
2
> $100 from the policy, so both legislators vote “Yes” and the
proposal passes. The same calculation works for any of the ambiguous speeches sent by the
lobbyist, so two legislators are willing to support the policy proposal following any speech
given by the lobbyist as part of this strategy. Furthermore, since the policy always passes,
the lobbyist never prefers to deviate from this speech strategy so this is an equilibrium.
Though the information provided by the expert is persuasive and accurate, the legislators
are ex ante unanimously worse off in this equilibrium than if they had not consulted an
expert. The ex ante expected payoff to each legislator when the lobbyist is persuasive is
1
4
· $250 + 1
4
· $105− $100 = −45
4
.
In comparison, the legislators receive an expected payoff of zero from automatically rejecting
the policy without listening to any speech. Ex ante, the legislators would therefore unan-
imously prefer to commit to an uninformed decision, but a strategic expert can package
information in a way that leads to sub-optimal outcomes for the legislature.
In what follows, I demonstrate that this phenomenon is not peculiar to Example 1 but is
applicable to a significant set of games resulting from a broad class of voting rules. I also
show that manipulative (ex ante welfare-reducing) persuasion is tied to collective preference
instability; regarding characteristics of voting rules, the possibility of collective choice cycles
is equivalent to the possibility of manipulative persuasion. Furthermore, equilibria with
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manipulative persuasion are stable in the sense that they are not eliminated by small changes
to the game. The results challenge the prevailing theories of institutions in which procedures
are chosen in order to maximize information transmission. Instead, voters may unanimously
prefer institutional arrangements that reduce opportunities for persuasion.
2.1 The model
Let N = {1, . . . , n} denote the set of voters and let E denote a single Expert. the voters
must decide whether to implement a proposed policy (x = 1) or reject the proposal in
favor of the status quo (x = 0). The utility to each agent from implementing the proposed
policy depends on the state of the world, denoted ω = (ωE, ω1, ω2, . . . , ωn). Specifically, the
utility of agent i is represented by the function ui(x, ω) = ωix for all i ∈ {E} ∪ N . Let
Ω = [−a, a]n ⊂ Rn denote the set of feasible states of the world.1
Collective decision-making proceeds as follows. First, Nature determines the value of ω and
reveals it to the Expert. Second, the Expert sends a payoff-irrelevant message s ∈ Ω to
the voters. Finally, all voters observe the Expert’s message and take an up-or-down vote
vi ∈ {No,Yes}. Let D ⊆ 2N\{∅} denote a set of decisive coalitions. If {i ∈ N : vi = Yes} ∈ D,
then the proposed policy is implemented (x = 1). Otherwise, the status quo persists (x = 0).
Assume D is monotonic (C ∈ D and C ⊆ C ′ imply C ′ ∈ D) and proper (C ∈ D implies
N\C 6∈ D). The class of voting rules permitted by these assumptions is related to that
in Banks and Duggan (2000) and Kalandrakis (2006) and subsume all supermajority rules,
weighted supermajority rules, certain bicameral voting rules, and many other institutional
arrangements.
1Ω is restricted in this way primarily for expositional ease. The results rely only on the fact that Ω is
convex and that (0, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ int(Ω).
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The value of ω is private information for the Expert. The distribution of ω is represented
by a common prior µ0 ∈ ∆(Ω), where ∆(Ω) is the set of probability measures on Ω. 2
Voters’ beliefs following the observation of a message s are denoted µs ∈ ∆(Ω). For any
µ ∈ ∆(Ω), let Eµ[ωi] denote the expected value of ωi under the probability measure µ. I
restrict my attention to prior distributions for which, absent any additional information, the
voters would choose to reject the proposal in favor of the status quo (i.e. for some C ∈ D,
we have Eµ[ωi] < 0 for all i ∈ C).
A strategy profile consists of a messaging strategy for the Expert and a voting strategy
for each voter. The Expert’s strategy is a function σ : Ω → ∆(Ω), where σ(s|ω) is the
probability distribution over the Expert’s messages when the state of the world is ω. A
voting strategy is a function v∗i : Ω → {No,Yes} mapping messages into voting decisions.
The definition of v∗i is potentially restrictive in that it rules out mixed voting strategies,
but Theorem 10 in the Appendix demonstrates that this restriction has no effect on the
communication outcomes that can be supported. Let v∗ = (v∗1, . . . , v
∗
n) be the profile of all
voting strategies. Let x∗(s|v∗,D) = 1 if {i ∈ N : v∗i (s) = Yes} ∈ D and 0 otherwise. Thus,
x∗ is a function mapping messages into voting outcomes given a profile of voting strategies.
I characterize perfect Bayesian equilibria in weakly undominated strategies. Thus, an equi-
librium is a pair (σ, v∗) such that:
1. s ∈ suppσ(·|ω) implies that s ∈ arg max
s′∈Ω
uE(x
∗(s|v∗,D), ω); and
2. For all i ∈ N and all s ∈ Ω, v∗i (s) = Yes if Eµs [ωi] > 0 and v∗i (s) = No if Eµs [ωi] < 0;
where µs is consistent with Bayes’ rule for all s ∈ supp(σ).
2More precisely, let B(Ω) be the Borel σ-algebra on Ω. ∆(Ω) is the set of all functions µ : B(Ω)→ [0, 1]
satisfying µ(Ω) = 1 and µ (∪tWt) =
∑
tWt for all countable sets of subsets {Wt} in B(Ω).
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Let S(µ0,D) be the set of all equilibria to the game induced by the prior distribution µ0 and
the voting rule D. The ex ante expected utility to voter i from each strategy profile (σ, v∗)
is U∗i (σ, v
∗) = Eµ0 [Eσ[ωix
∗(s|σ,D)]].
2.2 Babbling, Persuasion, and Expert Discretion
For any prior distribution, the game possesses babbling equilibria, defined as equilibria in
which no information is transmitted (µs = µ0 for all s ∈ Ω). To see this, suppose the Expert
mixes uniformly over all messages following any state of the world. Since σ(W |ω) is constant
for all W and ω, µs = µ0 for all s ∈ Ω and each v∗i (s) = 1 only if Eµ0 [ωi] ≥ 0. Furthermore,
since x∗(s|v∗,D) is constant with respect to s, arg max
s′∈Ω
uE(x
∗(s|v∗,D), ω) = Ω for all ω ∈ Ω.
Thus, this strategy profile is an equilibrium to the game.
I focus on equilibria in which communication affects the policy outcome (i.e. x∗(s|v∗,D) 6= 0
for some s). These are called persuasive equilibria. The game in Example 1 has a persuasive
equilibrium in which all voting outcomes match the Expert’s preferences toward the proposal.
The next result establishes this a general property of persuasive equilibria to the game.
Lemma 1. In any equilibrium, either x∗(s|v∗,D) is constant or x∗(s|v∗,D) = 1 only if
ωE ≥ 0 and x∗(s|v∗,D) = 0 only if ωE ≤ 0.
Lemma 1 paints a pessimistic picture of communication in this environment. Normatively,
one might hope that a voting body could benefit from the advice of the Expert while retaining
some independent decision-making authority. However, in this model, all equilibria involve
the voters either remaining uninformed or surrendering all policy discretion to the Expert.
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In many situations, one may expect that the preferences of the Expert do not depend on her
private information. For instance, in a judicial nomination hearing, the nominee has private
information about her political preferences but likely prefers to be confirmed regardless of
those political preferences. Similarly, a lobbyist who contracts with a client to advocate a
proposal may gather information that, while relevant to the voters, will not change her own
advocacy. In such circumstances, consultation with the Expert cannot be strictly beneficial
to the voters.
Lemma 2. If µ0({ω : ωE > 0}) = 1 or µ0({ω : ωE < 0}) = 1 then there does not exist a
D-preferred persuasive equilibrium.
These results do not necessarily imply that persuasive equilibria are bad for voters. In fact,
for some prior distributions there may be persuasive equilibria that improve voter welfare.
However, if voters benefit from consultation with the Expert then they would also have
benefited from delegating their authority direction to the Expert. A persuasive equilibrium
(σ, v∗) is Pareto-preferred by voters if U∗i (σ, v
∗) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N and U∗i (σ, v∗) > 0 for some
i ∈ N . A persuasive equilibrium is D-preferred if there exists C ∈ D such that U∗i (σ, v∗) ≥ 0
for all i ∈ C and U∗i (σ, v∗) > 0 for some i ∈ C. As Lemma 3 states, there is a D-preferred
equilibrium only if all members of some decisive coalition would prefer to switch from the
default (no communication) outcome to the opposite outcome if they knew that switching
would make the Expert better off.
Lemma 3. Assume µ0({ω : ωE = 0}) = 0. If a D-preferred equilibrium exists then there
exists C ∈ D such that
Eµ0 [ui(1, ω)|uE(1, ω) > uE(0, ω)] ≥ Eµ0 [ui(0, ω)|uE(1, ω) > uE(0, ω)]
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for all i ∈ C and this inequality is strict for some i ∈ C.
A direct implication of Lemma 3 is that any Pareto-preferred persuasive equilibria can be
supported using a binary messaging strategy: the Expert accurately reveals whether or not
she supports passage and a decisive coalition of voters follows the Expert’s recommendation.
Since Lemma 3 restricts the existence of D-preferred equilibria, it is tempting to reach the
stronger conclusion that D-preferred equilibria must also have this form. This stronger
conclusion is false, since there are circumstances under which more sophisticated messaging
strategies are required to persuade voters to maintain the default action when the Expert
prefers no change.3
Corollary 1. If a Pareto-preferred equilibrium exists then the following strategy profile is
an equilibrium. (1) For some s, s′ ∈ Ω with s 6= s′, σ(s|ω) = 1 for all ω such that ωE ≥ 0,
σ(s′|ω) = 1 for all ω such that ωE ≤ 0, and σ(s′′|ω) = 0 for all s′′ ∈ Ω\{s, s′} and all ω ∈ Ω.
(2) For all i ∈ N , v∗i (s) = 1 if and only if Eµ0 [ωi|ωE ≥ 0] ≥ 0 and v∗i (s′) = 0 if and only if
Eµ0 [ωi|ωE < 0] < 0.
Given Corollary 1, it is straightforward to verify the existence or non-existence of Pareto-
preferred persuasive equilibria in a given game. However, as Example 1 illustrates, there
are many possibilities for persuasive equilibria that are not ex ante preferred by voters. The
following section characterizes the existence of such equilibria.
3For instance, suppose there exists C ∈ D such that Eµ0 [ui(1, ω)|uE(0, ω) > uE(0, ω)] ≥
Eµ0 [ui(0, ω)|uE(1, ω) > uE(0, ω)] for all i ∈ C and this inequality is strict for some i ∈ C. Suppose
there exists another C′ ∈ D such that Eµ0 [ui(1, ω)|uE(1, ω) < uE(0, ω)] ≥ Eµ0 [ui(0, ω)|uE(1, ω) < uE(0, ω)]
for all i ∈ C′. Then all members of C benefit from a persuasive equilibrium, though a persuasive equilibrium
cannot be supported by a binary messaging strategy since members of C′ would pass the proposal when the
Expert recommends the status quo.
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2.3 Manipulative Persuasion
The previous results suggest that it can be difficult to improve voter welfare through consul-
tation with the Expert. Example 1 suggests a stronger result which is that the voters can be
made strictly worse off by communicating with the expert. I call this outcome manipulative
persuasion. In this section, I show that many voting bodies can be subject to manipulative
persuasion. Furthermore, the possibility of manipulative persuasion is tied directly to col-
lective preference instability: a voting rule is subject to manipulative persuasion if and only
if it allows collective preference cycles.
A persuasive equilibrium involves manipulative persuasion if U∗i (σ, v
∗) < 0 for all i ∈ N .
Since the existence of such equilibria depends on the prior distribution, I characterize the set
of prior distributions that allow manipulative persuasion for a given voting rule. For each
D ∈ 2N\{∅}, the manipulative persuasion set is
M(D) ={µ ∈ ∆(Ω) : ∃C ∈ D such that Eµ[ωi] < 0∀i ∈ C
and ∃(σ, v∗) ∈ S(µ,D) and U∗i (σ, v∗) < 0∀i ∈ N}, (2.1)
or the set of prior distributions for which the proposal would fail with no communication and
there exists an equilibrium with manipulative persuasion when the voting rule is D. Though
there are many welfare criteria under which one could say that persuasion is bad for voters,
I focus on unanimously bad persuasion because it is the strongest criterion. If a persuasive
equilibrium is dominated under this criterion, it is also dominated for some decisive coalition
and dominated according to total welfare.
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A notion of distance between probability distributions is helpful for characterizing the ma-
nipulative persuasion set of a game. If µ and µ′ are two probability measures on Ω, the
distance between µ and µ′ is δ(µ, µ′) = supA∈B(Ω) |µ(A) − µ′(A)|. When it is relevant, the
metric space for probability distributions on Ω is assumed to be (∆(Ω), δ).
The collegium of a voting rule is
⋂
C∈D C. A voting rule is collegial if it has a non-empty
collegium and non-collegial otherwise (Austen-Smith and Banks, 2000). To illustrate the
concept of collegial and non-collegial rules, consider the following examples:
• Three-person majority rule: The set of decisive coalitions isD = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}}.
Since {1, 2} ∩ {1, 3} ∩ {2, 3} = ∅, majority rule is non-collegial.
• Majority-rule with voter 1 as a veto player: D = {C ⊂ N : |C| ≥ n
2
and 1 ∈ C}. Since⋂
C∈D C = {1}, majority rule is collegial.
• Unanimity rule: The set of decisive coalitions is D = {N}. Since the entire set of
voters is in every decisive coalition, unanimity rule is collegial.
In other words, the collegium of a voting rule is the set of voters whose approval is always
required to pass a proposal.
Define a binary relation D over elements of Ω such that ω D ω′ if and only if {i : ωi ≥
ω′i} ∈ D. The voting rule D has a cycle in Ω if there exist ω, ω′, ω′′ ∈ Ω such that ω D ω′
and ω′ D ω′′ but not ω D ω′′. Voting rules that allow cycles are unstable in the sense that
the existence of an unbeaten alternative cannot be guaranteed.
Theorem 1. The following statements are equivalent:
1. D is non-collegial.
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2. D has a cycle in Ω.
3. There exists a non-empty open set O(D) ∈ ∆(Ω) such that O ⊂M(D).
The equivalence of conditions (1) and (2) in Theorem 1 is similar to standard results in social
choice theory that is related, for example, to a common result on the acyclicity of voting
rules by Nakamura (1979). The equivalence of conditions (1) and (3) is a new result and
the proof is accomplished by constructing the set O(D). The fact that O(D) is an open set
implies a form of stability: if prior distribution is in this set, the game resulting from a small
perturbation of the prior distribution also possesses a manipulative persuasive equilibrium.
Theorem 1 shows that the distinction between collegial and non-collegial voting rules de-
termines whether or not manipulative persuasion is possible. The next comparative statics
result also provides insights into which rules are more or less manipulative within the class
of non-collegial rules. Let D and D′ be two distinct voting rules. D is more resolute than
D′ if and only if D′ ⊂ D4. The concept of resoluteness provides a partial order over all
voting rules considered in this model. Theorem 2 establishes that resoluteness also provides
a partial ranking of the manipulability of voting rules.
Theorem 2. If D is more resolute than D′, then M(D′) ⊆M(D).
Resoluteness facilitates comparisons between many commonly observed voting rules. For ex-
ample, majority rule is more resolute than a supermajority requirement and the resoluteness
of a supermajority rule decreases with the size of the required supermajority. By Theorem
2, it follows that manipulative persuasion should be less common for higher supermajority
4The definition of resoluteness provided in Austen-Smith and Banks (2000) is more general in that it
applies to rules that cannot be fully represented by a set of decisive coalitions (for example, Borda count).
That definition states that that Rule A is more resolute than Rule B if, any time an alternative strictly is
socially preferred to another under Rule B, that alternative is also strictly preferred under Rule A. For the
class of rules considered here, the two definitions are equivalent.
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rules.5 Though resoluteness is primarily useful for comparing non-collegial rules, it is also
consistent with Theorem 1 in the sense that no collegial rule is more resolute than any
non-collegial rule.
In the context of supermajority rules, Theorem 2 also provides a stronger connection be-
tween collective choice instability and a manipulability by an expert. Within the class of
supermajority rules, simple majority rules are the most prone to cycles and stricter super-
majority requirements reduce the propensity for cycles. Thus, a supermajority rule that is
more resolute is more prone to instability and to expert manipulation.
Theorem 2 suggests that voters face a trade-off with respect to choosing voting rules. Less
resolute rules increase the difficulty of passing a proposal by requiring greater consensus.
Therefore, these rules may lead to excessive rejection of proposals that most voters favor.
However, the increased difficulty of passing proposals may benefit the voters by preventing
expert manipulation.
2.4 Potential Remedies to Manipulative Persuasion
In this section I explore several potential remedies to manipulative persuasion. I show that
restricting the domain of voter utilities to those that can be represented by one-dimensional
quadratic preferences eliminates the possibility of manipulation by an expert. Restricting the
domain to quadratic spatial preferences in multiple dimensions does not rule out manipulative
persuasion, so the effectiveness of this remedy is due to the one-dimensional aspect of the
5In a model of expert communication to committees in one-dimensional policy spaces, Jackson and Tan
(2012) also find that supermajority rules can provide informational advantages. In their model, where
information transmission is always beneficial to the voters, the advantage of supermajority rules comes from
promoting more communication as opposed to preventing manipulation.
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restriction. Restricting communication to a single dimension does not eliminate manipulative
persuasion nor does allowing communication by multiple experts.
2.4.1 Domain restrictions
Though Theorems 1 and 2 are powerful results, they are limited in that they demonstrate
what is possible rather than what is inevitable or even probable. In fact, my argument
for the existence of a non-empty manipulative persuasion set relies on the assumption that
all probability distributions over expected utility are feasible. This is a limitation shared
by the classic results in social choice theory. Arrow’s impossibility theorem6, which shows
that all non-dictatorial preference aggregation rules that are Pareto efficient must allow
violations of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives or allow preference cycles, relies on
the assumption of an unrestricted domain of preference profiles. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite
theorem7, which demonstrates that if there are more than two alternatives to choose from
then any non-dictatorial choice rule may provide incentives for voters to misreport their
preferences, also relies on unrestricted domain. In the case of Arrow’s theorem, restrictions
on the domain of preferences such as single-peakedness can alleviate the problems raised
by these results, though the negative result of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem is not
eliminated by restriction to single-peaked preferences (Penn, Patty and Gailmard, 2011).
In this section, I consider domain restrictions on distributions of utility. In the case of
majority rule with an odd number of voters, if the state space is limited to distributions of
utility that can be represented by quadratic preferences on a single dimension, the possibility
6See Arrow (1951).
7See Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975)
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of manipulative persuasion is eliminated.8 Thus, returning to the one-dimensional world of
most models of communication (for example, Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987, 1989, 1987)) in
political science returns the conventional wisdom about the value of information. Theorem
3 states this result.
Theorem 3. Assume that n is odd and let Dm = {C ⊂ N : |C| > n
2
}. Fix a vector
z = (z1, . . . , zn) ∈ Rn and for some q ∈ R let
Θ(q) = {ω ∈ Ω : ∃θ ∈ R s.t. ωi = (zi − q)2 − (zi − θ)2∀i ∈ N}.
If µ0(Θ(q)) = 1, then all persuasive equilibria are majority preferred.
Restricting the domain of voter utilities to those that can be represented in one dimension
eliminates the possibility of expert manipulation precisely because it eliminates the instabil-
ity associated with majority rule. However, since Ω includes distributions of utility that are
not necessarily represented by any spatial preferences, one might be concerned that Theorem
1 results primarily from allowing non-standard distributions of utility. Unfortunately, results
for spatial preferences are difficult to prove and straightforward examples are elusive. How-
ever, Example 2 demonstrates that manipulative persuasion is possible for two-dimensional
quadratic preferences and continuous prior distributions.
Example 2. Consider a three-member majority-rule voting body. The preferences of the
voters are represented by quadratic preferences in a two-dimensional policy space with a
status quo located at the origin. That is, letting zi = (zi1, zi2) ∈ R2 denote the ideal point
of voter i and a state θi ∈ R2, we have ωi = z2i1 + z2i2 − (zi1 − θ1)2 − (zi2 − θ2)2. Assume
8Since this model involves decision-making over lotteries, single-peakedness alone is not sufficient to
guarantee the result. In addition, it is required that there is a voter who is decisive over lotteries, which is
guaranteed in the case of an odd number of voters with quadratic preferences (Banks and Duggan, 2006).
19
Voter 1
(−1
2
, 9
10
)
Voter 2
(
9
10
,− 1
30
)
Voter 3
(−3
5
,− 9
10
)
Table 2.2: Ideal points for voters in Example 2.
that θ is uniformly distributed on the unit disk (i.e. the probability density is f0(θ) =
1
2pi
if
||θ|| < 1 and 0 otherwise). The payoff of the expert is equal to 1 if the proposal is passed an
0 otherwise. The ideal points of the voters are provided in Table 2.2.
The expectation of f0 is equal to (0, 0). Since the status quo is also located at (0, 0) and the
voters are risk-averse, the voters unanimously prefer to reject the proposal in favor of the
status quo. However, there is a (manipulative) persuasive equilibrium to this game, as will
be demonstrated below.
To state the equilibrium messaging strategy, it is helpful to re-express points in the policy
space in polar coordinates. For any θ = (θ1, θ2), the polar coordinates (r, φ) are characterized
by θ1 = r cosφ and θ2 = r sinφ. Here r is the Euclidean distance of θ from the status quo
and φ is the angle enclosed by the θ vector and positive horizontal axis (measured in radians
and ranging from 0 to 2π). Consider the following pure messaging strategy:
suppσ = {s1, s2, s3}
σ(s1|θ) = 1 if 0 ≤ φ ≤ 2
3
π
σ(s2|θ) = 1 if 2
3
π ≤ φ ≤ 4
3
π
σ(s3|θ) = 1 if 4
3
π ≤ φ ≤ 2π.
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Voter 1
Voter 2
Voter 3
s1
s2
s3
Figure 2.1: A visual depiction of the equilibrium in Example 2. The shaded regions represent
a partition of the policy space which is bounded in the unit disk. The expert accurately
reveals which partition contains the true state.
In other words, the expert divides the space into three equally sized circle segments and
accurately reveals which of these segments contains the true state of the world. Figure 2.1
displays this strategy visually. The expected utilities to voters from passing the proposal
following each signal are calculated in Appendix B and displayed numerically in Table 2.3.
s1 s2 s3
Voter 1 .105 .081 -1.180
Voter 2 0.063 -1.07 .015
Voter 3 -1.22 .16 .07
Table 2.3: Expected payoffs to each voter from passing a proposal following each signal in
the persuasive equilibrium in Example 2. All payoffs are relative to the status quo.
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If voters play best-responses to this messaging strategy, voters 1 and 2 approve the proposal
following s1, voters 1 and 3 approve following s2, and voters 2 and 3 approve the proposal
following s3. Thus, this strategy profile constitutes a persuasive equilibrium in which the
proposal passes following all messages.
Example 2 demonstrates that manipulative persuasion is possible in spatial settings with
continuous probability distributions. Hence, the phenomenon described in this paper is not
a result of non-standard distributions of preferences. The reliance on a uniform probability
distribution is convenient but not necessary to support the outcome. In fact, the openness
property proven in Theorem 1 implies that many nearby probability distributions could
support the same outcome.
2.4.2 Limiting Communication
Since manipulative persuasion relies on the ability of the expert to induce collective pref-
erence cycles over potential lotteries faced by voters, it may be possible given some prior
distributions to avoid manipulation by only allowing the expert to communicate about one
policy dimension. This solution would mirror one of the insights of Shepsle and Weingast’s
(1981) concept of structure-induced equilibrium, that the well-known problems of manipula-
tion by an agenda-setter can be avoided by requiring agenda-setting on only one dimension
at a time. Unfortunately, limiting communication to a single dimension does not provide a
general solution to the problem of manipulative persuasion, as Example 3 demonstrates.
Example 3. This example is constructed by embedding the game from Example 2 in a
three dimensional space. Consider a three-member voting body operating by majority rule.
Let ui(x, θ) = −
∑3
j=1(zij − θi)2 and z1 =
(−1
2
, 9
10
, z13
)
, z2 =
(
9
10
,− 1
30
, z23
)
, and z3 =
22
(−3
5
,− 9
10
, z33). Thus, the ideal point of the voters on the first two policy dimensions are
identical to those in Example 2. Furthermore, let θ ∈ R3, let (θ1, θ2) be distributed uniformly
on the set {(x, y) ∈ R2 :
√
x2 + y2 ≤ 1} so that the marginal distributions of θ1 and θ2 are
represented by the density f0 from Example 2. Finally, if φ is the angular coordinate of (θ1, θ2)
in two-dimensional polar coordinates and ǫ > 0, assume that the conditional distribution
of θ3 is uniform on (−ǫ, 0) if φ ∈ [0, 23π), uniform on [0, ǫ/2) if [23π, 43π), and uniform on
[ǫ/2, ǫ). If the expert perfectly reveals θ3, conditional beliefs about θ1 and θ2 are equal to the
posterior beliefs from Example 2. Furthermore, for any η > 0, if ǫ is sufficiently small then
voters’ expected utilities from each lottery are within η of the payoffs from Table 2.3. Thus,
there exists a manipulative persuasive equilibrium to this game when ǫ is small enough.
Example 3 has an unusual structure but illustrates the relevant point: unidimensional com-
munication can harm welfare if the dimension on which communication occurs is correlated
with the other dimensions in a way that can induce cycles over conditional lotteries. Fur-
thermore, the strategy profile suggested by Example 3 would still be an equilibrium if the
expert did not know θ1 or θ2, which suggests that restricting the expert’s information to a
single dimension also does not eliminate the problem. Even requiring the expert to commu-
nicate only about the payoff of only one voter would not rule out manipulative persuasion
for non-collegial rules, since that voter need not be in any of the decisive coalitions that are
relevant to the final outcome.
It is possible, however, to eliminate the possibility of manipulative persuasion by limiting
communication. In fact, as Lemma 3 suggests, manipulation can be eliminated in all cases by
limiting communication to binary endorsements. In fact, the common practice of demanding
yes-or-no answers from officials and experts in Congressional hearings suggests that legisla-
tors may have an intuitive understanding of this fact. Overall, restricting experts to coarse
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messaging strategies is a more promising approach to preventing manipulation than allowing
unlimited communication on only one dimension.
2.4.3 Multiple experts
Though the model considers communication by a single expert, voting bodies are often able
to consult with many experts on the same topic. In models of multidimensional cheap talk
to a single decision-maker, the presence of multiple experts is known to dramatically improve
the prospects for beneficial advice to the decision-maker (Battaglini, 2002). However, the
main results of this paper are robust to the inclusion of multiple experts. In fact, including
additional experts never eliminates a manipulative persuasive equilibrium and may expand
the possibilities for manipulation.
To see that the inclusion of an additional expert does not eliminate the possibility of ma-
nipulation, fix a single-expert game (N ∪ E,D, µ0). Consider a new game that is identical
except for the inclusion of a new expert E ′. The new game is (N ∪ E ∪ E ′,D, µ′0) where
µ′0 ∈ ∆(Ω× [−a, a]), m(ωE′) is the new marginal probability measure over the new expert’s
payoff, and Em(W−E′) = µ0(W ) for all W−E′ ∈ B(Ω).
If (σ, v∗) is a manipulative persuasive equilibrium to (N ∪E,D, µ0) then there is an equilib-
rium to (N ∪E ∪E ′,D, µ′0) in which E plays the original strategy σ, voters use the original
voting strategy profile v∗ and the new expert E ′ babbles. Since E ′ transmits no new informa-
tion, the strategies of the original players remain optimal. Furthermore, since voters’ actions
do not depend on messages from E ′, the new expert faces no incentive to deviate from this
strategy. This demonstrates that including a new expert does not reduce the manipulative
persuasion set M(D) associated with any voting rule. In addition, if the distributions over
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ωE and ωE′ are fixed, there may be distributions over voter utility for which E
′ can manipu-
late but E cannot. Thus, instead of eliminating the potential for manipulation, adding more
experts may reduce ex ante voter welfare.
2.5 A note on equilibrium selection
In the spirit of the canonical results in social choice theory, the focus of this study was on
the set of outcomes that are possible for a given voting rule. As a consequence, I have not
explored issues related to equilibrium selection. This might lead some to conclude that expert
manipulation, while possible, is not a practical concern faced by voting bodies. After all, if
the persuasive outcomes are all bad for the voters, they can always fall back on the babbling
equilibrium outcome. In this section, I argue that if manipulative persuasion equilibria exist
then they are the best prediction for the outcome of the game.
Blume and Sobel (1995) proposed a criterion for selecting equilibria in cheap talk games
based on the idea the equilibrium should not be affected if new opportunities for commu-
nication arose. This equilibrium selection criterion is based on the notion of stable sets 9
with respect to a dominance relation. Assume that σ has finite support.10 In the language
of Blume and Sobel (1995) an agreement is a triple (σ, {vi}i∈N , µ) where µ gives the prob-
ability distribution over states and (σ, {vi}i∈N) is an equilibrium to the game given µ. The
agreement (σ, {vi}i∈N , µ) CP trumps (σ′, {v′i}i∈N , µ′) if there exists a message s such that:
(1) there is some ω such that σ(s|ω) > 0 and µ(W ) = µ′s(W ) for all W ∈ B(Ω) where µ′s
is the posterior probability measure on states after conditioning on the signal s; and (2) if
9The notion of stable sets was first defined by Neumann and Morgenstern (1944).
10The assumption that σ has finite support is without loss of generality for babbling equilibria and holds
for any of the manipulative persuasion equilibria in the set characterized by Theorem 1.
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σ(s|ω) > 0 then E[uE(x∗(s′|v,D))|σ] > E[uE(x∗(s′|v′,D))|σ′]. Intuitively, (σ, {vi}i∈N , µ) CP
trumps (σ′, {v′i}i∈N , µ′) if for some message sent in the equilibrium (σ′, {v′i}i∈N), (σ, {vi}i∈N)
is an equilibrium to the game that would be induced by allowing a second round of commu-
nication and the Expert strictly prefers this new equilibrium to the old one.
The stable set11 of the “CP trumps” relation is a set of equilibria such that: (1) no equilibria
inside the set is trumped by any other equilibrium inside the set, and (2) any equilibrium
outside the set is trumped by some equilibrium inside the set. An equilibrium is called
communication proof if it is an element of this stable set. Consider a game in which the
equilibria consist of a set of persuasive equilibria and a set of babbling equilibria. Since
persuasive equilibria yield the Expert the best feasible payoff (by Lemma 1), it is immediate
that no equilibrium trumps any persuasive equilibrium. Furthermore, since babbling equilib-
ria yield voter beliefs that are equal to the prior and give the Expert a lower payoff than the
persuasive equilibrium in every state, every persuasive equilibrium trumps every babbling
equilibrium. Thus, in such a game, only the persuasive equilibria are communication proof.
This argument holds regardless of the welfare effects of the equilibrium for the voters, so this
provides a rationale for selecting manipulative persuasion equilibria.
There is one situation in which the argument from above fails to select only persuasive
equilibria. Suppose that there are no states for which the voters would pass the proposal if
they had complete information. There may be a manipulative persuasive equilibrium to such
a game.12 However, there is also an equilibrium in which the expert fully reveals the state of
the world and the voters reject the proposal following any message on or off the equilibrium
path of play. This equilibrium is not CP trumped by any other equilibrium since the Expert
11Proposition One of Blume and Sobel (1995) shows that this stable set is unique.
12For instance, eliminating the “equitable” state from Example 1 and leaving the lobbyist’s strategy the
same but limited to the three remaining states yields a persuasive equilibrium to that game.
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cannot un-reveal information that has been fully transmitted to the voters. Thus, both the
persuasive equilibrium and the fully revealing equilibrium are communication proof even
though the latter is payoff equivalent to the babbling equilibrium. However, the idea that
the players believe that opportunities for further communication could arise suggests that
the Expert would be unlikely to play this equilibrium, since the babbling equilibrium gives
every player the same payoffs without foreclosing the idea of profitable communication at a
later time.
2.6 Discussion
I have analyzed a model of communication from an expert to a voting body in a multidimen-
sional policy space. In contrast to existing models of communication in political institutions,
I show that persuasion by an expert can reduce the welfare of all voters. In fact, the pos-
sibility of expert manipulation is a feature of all cyclic voting rules. This result challenges
prevailing informational theories of legislative and electoral institutions, which posit that
uncertainty reduction inevitably leads to better policy decisions. For instance, the infor-
mational approach to legislative organization views legislative institutions as chosen for the
purpose of providing “incentives for individuals to develop policy expertise and share policy-
relevant information with fellow legislators” (Krehbiel, 1991). My argument implies that this
theoretical approach requires revision in situations where policies are not unidimensional. In
many situations, legislators would unanimously prefer institutions that reduce information
transmission.
My main results are related to previous theoretical results in the literature. Fernandez
and Rodrik (1991) showed that when there is ex ante uncertainty about who gains or loses
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from reforms and policies are chosen through a majority vote, reforms may be rejected ex
ante even though a majority of voters benefit from the reform ex post. Chakraborty and
Harbaugh (2010) show by example that communication from an expert can reduce voter
welfare. Their example features a jury operating by unanimity rule. Jurors are privately
informed about their preferences and a defense attorney is privately informed about the case
facts. Communication by the defense attorney lowers expected voter welfare by increasing the
probability of acquital to suboptimal levels.13 Finally, Alonzo and Caˆmara (2014) develop
a model of information and voting in which the expert has no private information but
can design the information content of a public signal. These public signals, like the expert
communication in my model, can harm public welfare. Furthermore, as in this study, stricter
supermajority rules reduce the harm from informational manipulation.
The current model assumes that experts are not voters. A natural extension is to model sit-
uations in which voters themselves have expert information, which introduces the additional
complication that the expert’s vote conveys some information and voters can condition on
being pivotal (Austen-Smith and Feddersen, 2006a). The question of whether deliberation
among voters with private information is subject to welfare-reducing manipulation is still
open. Extending the model to incorporate multiple voting experts would be a first step
toward a multidimensional model of deliberation and debate in the spirit of Austen-Smith
and Riker (1987) or Austen-Smith (1990).
The model also assumes that policy proposals are generated exogenously and cannot be
altered once introduced. The exogenous proposals distinguishes this paper from models of
13The voting example in Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010) differs from this study because welfare effects
depend on random components of voter preferences rather than on instability of collective preferences. In fact,
welfare-reducing persuasion is not possible for unanimity rule in my model. Futhermore, in the Chakraborty
and Harbaugh (2010) example, if voter welfare is measured after voters know their own preferences (as in this
study, where voter preferences for a given state are known), expert communication improves voter welfare.
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legislative bargaining, which have been extended to incomplete information environments by
Meirowitz (2007a). The fact that proposals cannot be altered amounts to an assumption that
the voting body operates under a closed rule. Though this assumption is appropriate in pop-
ular elections and some legislatures, it contrasts with models of the United States Congress
in which bills can be considered under open or closed rules . Unfortunately, though one-
dimensional models rely on the assumption that bills are amended to reflect the preferences
of the chamber median under open rules, there is no similarly justifiable assumption in the
absense of a core. However, the fact that information transmission can be problematic under
closed rules is significant in light of the common theoretical claim that closed amendment
rules are justified on informational grounds (Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1987).
Overall, this paper provides novel results regarding information transmission by experts
and its substantive impact on voting. It also provides a general, flexible formal framework
that can be easily extended to study a number of legislative and electoral institutions. This
study also suggests that exploring the connections between signaling models and social choice
thoeretic concepts is a fruitful path for future research.
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Chapter 3
Informational Lobbying and
Legislative Voting
The central importance of lobbying in American politics is often viewed as part of a mutually
beneficial arrangement between legislators and interest groups. Legislators lack information
required to make good policies and get reelected and interest groups supply this information
and in so doing gain valuable influence on policy-making. As Wright (1996) phrased the
argument, “The informational relationship between legislators and lobbyists has a marketlike
quality to it: legislators demand information to reduce uncertainty, and lobbyists supply it”
(p. 88). However, this reliance on lobbyists also makes legislators vulnerable to manipulation
since lobbyists may exaggerate or misprepresent facts to suit their needs (Schattschneider,
1947, p. 199). Do the gains in information from interest group influence make up for the
losses in terms of representation?
In this paper, I analyze the positive and normative implications of lobbying in an environ-
ment with multiple lobbyists and multiple legislators. A critical feature of the model is the
incorporation of voting with multiple legislators. This is a departure from the literature
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on informational lobbying which is based on one-legislator models. However, incorporat-
ing voting institutions into theories of lobbying is realistic and substantively critical: at its
heart, lobbying is about building coalitions in favor of one’s preferred policy.14 Lobbyists are
unlikely to expend resources persuading a particular legislator to support a policy if they
will fall short of a majority with or without that legislator’s support. Furthermore, lobbyists
can emphasize different aspects of a policy to appeal to different groups: an opponent of
the Affordable Care Act may have appealed to libertarians on the basis of federal spending
and to social conservatives on the basis of abortion policy. The presence of multiple winning
coalitions also affects the welfare implications of information transmission since providing
information to a single decision-maker always improves welfare but information transmission
to a voting body can reduce ex ante welfare (Schnakenberg, 2014).
I also depart from previous models by analyzing interest groups that are purely vote-oriented
in the sense that their preferences do not depend on the aspects of the policy that affect
legislative preferences. This is a realistic focus for many policy settings. For instance,
representatives from lobbying firms may contract with clients to advocate certain policies.
In these cases, the firms gather information relevant to the legislators’ support for that policy,
but their own advocacy does not depend on that information. Similarly, a manufacturer of
textiles may lobby in favor of higher tariffs on foreign textiles on the basis of domestic
unemployment or foreign labor rights even though their support for the policy depends only
on its effect on their company’s profits. The focus on vote-oriented lobbyists is useful in
part because traditional one-legislator models would predict that these groups could not be
effective15 yet they often influence policy-making in the multiple legislator model because
14Baron and Hirsch (2012) analyze a model in which lobbyists attempt to influence coalitions in addition
to policy in a parliamentary government formation setting. In this model, the means of lobbying is through
direct contributions rather than persuasion.
15To see why vote-oriented lobbyists cannot be effective in one legislator models, suppose that when the
lobbyist’s information suggests that the legislator’s preferences would align with the lobbyist’s, the lobbyist
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they can inform the legislators about which coalition is likely to benefit from the proposed
policy. Thus, even purely vote-oriented groups can gain influence by appealing to different
coalitions at different times.
The normative implications of the model are straightforward but differ from traditional
models: influential lobbying by vote-oriented interest groups is always bad for welfare. In
contrast, lobbyist influence in one legislator models always weakly benefits the legislator
since rationality of the legislator provides a check on the lobbyist’s incentive to lie. If the
legislator is rational, the worst-case scenario is the new information is useless, but then the
legislator is free to ignore it and make whatever decision she would have made in the absence
of that information. In voting settings, however, legislators can lose in expectation from the
introduction of new information since they may be left out of the winning coalition as often as
they are included. For majority voting, this result is related to Anscombe’s (1976) paradox,
which states that if several issues are decided by a yes-or-no vote, the majority might vote in
the minority on the majority of issues. In probabilistic terms, a related fact is that majority
preferences over a set of lotteries over policies may conflict with majority preferences over a
compound lottery made up of those lotteries.
The positive implications of the model are more nuanced. The prediction of the model
depends on the expected distribution of benefits from the policy in the following way. If
the relative potential gains to losses from the policy are sufficiently high, an interest group
promoting that policy can always influence the legislature to pass that policy when there is
no competition from opposing interest groups. In the presence of competition from opposing
gives a speech interpreted as ”Trust me, you will like what happens if you vote in favor of this policy.” If
the legislator believes this speech and votes in favor of the policy, then the lobbyist will be tempted to send
give this speech even when it is not true. Therefore, the legislator, knowing that the lobbyist faces this
temptation, expects that the lobbyist would make the same speech whether or not she would truly like the
effect of the policy. Therefore, the legislator assumes that the lobbyist’s speech is uninformative about her
true preferences regarding the policy, and disregard the speech.
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interest groups, an interest group promoting a policy can still influence the legislature to
pass the policy if the distribution of expected benefits from the policy are not too targeted
to a minority of legislators. Otherwise, the interest group promoting the status quo can
block the other interest group from influencing the legislators.
3.1 Related literature
The model closely relates to a large body of theory on informational lobbying.16 The sem-
inal work on informational lobbying came in the early 1990’s. Potters and Winden (1990)
formalize idea of political pressure as information transmission and prove the existence of
political pressure in a dynamic game between an interest group and a legislator. Another
single interest-group model by Potters and Winden (1992) shows that conflicts of interest
between interest groups and legislators can prevent credible informational lobbying and that
the imposition of lobbying costs restores credibility when conflicts of interest are not too
severe.17 Austen-Smith and Wright (1992) analyze a model in which two opposing interest
groups transmit information to a single legislator in order to influence her vote. In that
model, legislators make better decisions on average with lobbying than without and the in-
formational gains from lobbying are more pronounced when the issue is very salient to the
interest group. Ainsworth (1993) shows how legislators have incentives to regulate lobbying
in ways that make their signals costly and limit their temptation to exaggerate. More re-
cent theoretical studies focus on the implications of the fact that financial contributions to
16See Grossman and Helpman (2001, Chapter 4) for a thorough review of the early work in this literature.
17This relates to a more general point, due to Crawford and Sobel (1982), that “cheap talk” information
transmission is less informative the more the preferences of the sender and receiver diverge.
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campaigns grants lobbyists access to legislators so that they can attempt to persuade them
to support their preferred policies (Cotton, 2012).18
The most significant challenge to informational theories was raised by Hall and Deardorff
(2006). Though existing informational theories suggest that interest groups should focus
their lobbying efforts on legislators that are undecided or inclined to vote against their
position, the empirical patterns are exactly the opposite: interest groups spend most of their
time lobbying their natural allies. Though Austen-Smith and Wright (1994) addressed this
inconsistency with a model showing that lobbyists may target allies in order to prevent them
from being influenced by opposing interest groups, their model still predicts that interest
groups only lobby allies that are close to the fence and will do so less often than non-allies,
so informational theories are not fully consistent with empirical patterns of lobbying. Thus,
Hall and Deardorff conclude that the informational model does not capture the nature of
lobbying activity. Instead, they claim that lobbying is a form of legislative subsidy: lobbyists
provide labor and expertise to like-minded legislators who are strapped for resources in order
to make them more effective at advancing their interests.
As I discuss later in this paper, the criticism raised by Hall and Deardorff illustrates the
theoretical confusion that results from making predictions about which legislators groups
should lobby using theories with only one legislator to be lobbied. Furthermore, though
informational lobbying and legislative subsidy are usually posed as competing theories, they
are not mutually exclusive and in fact complement one another. As Hall and Deardorff note,
expertise is one of the resources that lobbyists make available to legislators. Certainly the
information provided to legislators by lobbyists is used to build coalitions in favor of their
18Lohmann (1995) also addresses this topic and shows that campaign contributions can increase the
credibility of communication from lobbyists. Cotton (2012) examines the implications of these access costs
for the welfare effects of limits on campaign contributions.
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policy positions and lobbyists provide information along with advice about how it should
be disseminated. Thus, the expertise provided by lobbyists as a subsidy to like-minded
legislators is only one step removed from standard accounts of informational lobbying.19
One exception to the tendency of the informational lobbying literature to focus on single
legislator models is a study by Bennedsen and Feldmann (2002) that complements this
study. In that model, a single lobbying group communicates with legislators about demand
for a public good and then a randomly chosen agenda-setter proposes a distribution of the
public good across the districts. The proposal is then subject to a majority vote. Like
this study, the model in Bennedsen and Feldmann (2002) shows that lobbying a voting
body can provide greater opportunity for information transmission than lobbying a single
individual because the information transmitted can affect the composition of the winning
coalition that comes together to pass or block a policy proposal. Unlike this study, Bennedsen
and Feldmann’s (2002) model has endogenous proposals and communication occurs at the
agenda-setting stage. Furthermore, in their model, the lobbying group’s utility is increasing
in the total amount of the public good that is provided. Their model does not produce the
negative welfare results in this study, which suggests that interest group influence is more
productive at the agenda-setting stage of policy-making and when the lobbying group has
state-dependent preferences.
A model by Caillaud and Tirole (2007) also explores strategies that can be used to persuade
a voting body to pass a bill. In that model, the lobbyist20 does not have private information
about the effect of the bill on a legislator’s payoff but can provide legislators with a report
19For instance, if a lobbyist provides information to a legislator with the same preferences as herself it is
an equilibrium for that lobbyist to provide instructions to allow that legislator to implement the strategy
she would have used to persuade the entire legislature.
20In Caillaud and Tirole (2007) this player is called a “sponsor” and the voting players are called “group
members.” I am referring to them as lobbyists and legislators to make clear the relationship of their paper
to the current application.
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that allows them to determine this information for themselves. They show that by targeting
key legislators the lobbyist can sometimes engineer “persuasion cascades” in which bringing
key members on board sways the opinions of others.
3.2 Model
The set of players is G1 ∪G2 ∪N where N = {1, . . . , n} is a set of legislators with n ≥ 3, G1
is an interest group in favor of some new policy, and G2 is an interest group in favor of the
status quo. The legislators must decide whether to implement a new policy (x = 1) or reject
it in favor of the status quo (x = 0). The state of the world W ∈ 2N is a set of beneficiaries
of the policy. Thus, ifW = ∅ then no legislators would benefit from implementing the policy,
if W = N then all legislators would benefit from the policy, and if W = C ⊂ N then only
legislators in the set C would benefit from implementing the policy.
The set of beneficiaries W is private information to the interest groups and is not observed
by the legislators. The legislators’ beliefs about the distribution of W are represented by
a common prior p that assigns a probability to each subset of N . I assume that p has
full support on 2N , so that p(W ) > 0 for all W ⊂ N . For each k ∈ {0, . . . , n}, let pk =∑
W :|W |=k p(W ) denote the probability that the number of beneficiaries is equal to k.
The sequence of play is as follows. First, G1 chooses a set of legislators M1 ⊂ N to lobby.
The role of lobbying in this model is purely communicative – to lobby a particular legislator
is to approach that legislator and make a speech having the interpretation “I recommend
that you vote in favor of my preferred policy.” M1 = ∅ is interpreted as a decision not to
engage in lobbying. Next, G2 observes M1 and chooses a set of legislators M2 ⊂ N to lobby.
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Finally, the legislators observeM1 andM2, update their beliefs about the set of beneficiaries,
and take an up-or-down vote over whether or not to implement the new policy. Legislators’
votes are translated into outcomes according to a q-majority rule: the policy is implemented
if and only if the number of legislators who vote in favor is at least q, where n
2
< q ≤ n.
The interests groups have opposing preferences: G1 is in favor of the new policy and G2 is
in favor of the status quo. In addition to the utility they receive from policy, the groups
pay a fixed cost for lobbying. Thus, letting m1 = 1 if M1 6= ∅ and m1 = 0 otherwise, the
preferences of G1 are represented by the utility function
uG1(x,m1) = x− cm1 (3.1)
where 0 < c < 1. Likewise, the utility function for G2 is
uG2(x,m2) = −x− cm2 (3.2)
where m2 = 1 if M2 6= ∅ and 0 otherwise. The lobbying cost c may represent direct labor
and expenses from lobbying, access costs such as campaign donations or costs of acquiring
expertise.21
The legislators’ utility functions are
ui(x,W ) =


xH if i ∈ W
−xL if i 6∈ W
(3.3)
21Interpreting c as the cost of acquiring expertise would require modifying the game so that the the set of
beneficiaries is only revealed to each group after they decide in favor of lobbying. This modification would
not substantively affect the results, since the decision of whether or not to lobby does not depend on the
group’s private information in equilibrium.
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for all i ∈ N , where H > 0 and L > 0. In other words, each legislator receives a payoff of
H if the policy is implemented and she is a beneficiary, −L if the policy is implemented and
she is not a beneficiary, and 0 if the policy is rejected.
To simplify the presentation of results, I assume that the policy proposal would fail in the
absence of lobbying. This requires that at least q legislators’ prior expected utilities are
negative. Thus, the focus of the analysis is on cases in which G1 attempts to influence the
legislators to vote in favor of the policy, though the results would extend naturally to the
opposite case.
3.3 Strategies and Equilibrium
The analysis allows interest groups to use mixed lobbying strategies. A strategy for G1 is
a function σ1 : 2
N → ∆(2N), where ∆(2N) is the set of probability distributions over 2N .
The function σ1 specifies a probability of lobbying each subset of legislators for each possible
set of beneficiaries. Thus, σ1(M |W ) denotes the probability that M1 = M when the set of
beneficiaries is W .
A strategy for G2 is a function σ2 : 2
N × 2N → ∆(2N) specifying a probability of lobbying
each subset of legislators given the set of beneficiaries and the set of legislators lobbied by
G1. Thus, σ2(M |W,M1) is the probability that M2 = M given that the set of beneficiaries
is W and the set of legislators lobbied by G1 is M1.
Without loss of generality, I consider only pure voting strategies.22 The voting strategy
of legislator i ∈ N , denoted vi(M1,M2), is equal to 1 if that legislator votes in favor of
22Theorem 4 in Schnakenberg (2014) implies that, for any equilibrium in mixed voting strategies, there is
some equilibrium in pure voting strategies where G1 and G2 use exactly the same lobbying strategies.
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the policy following M1 and M2 and zero otherwise. Given the q-majority rule, the policy
outcome x∗(M1,M2) is equal to 1 if
∑
i∈N vi(M1,M2) ≥ q and zero otherwise.
The beliefs of the legislators about the state of the world following M1 and M2 are denoted
π(W |M1,M2). Given these beliefs, the expected utility of implementing the policy for each
legislator is
Upii (M1,M2) =
∑
W∈2N
π(W |M1,M2)ui(1,W ). (3.4)
The analysis characterizes perfect Bayesian equilibria in weakly undominated strategies.
Specifically, an equilibrium to the game is a profile of strategies such that:
• M1 maximizes x∗(M1,M2) given σ2 and {vi}i∈N ;
• M2 minimizes x∗(M1,M2) given M1 and {vi}i∈N ;
• Legislators vote in favor of the policy if and only if23 Upii (M1,M2) ≥ 0; where
• π(W |M1,M2) is consistent with Bayes rule when possible.
The decision rule for legislators reduces to a simple comparison of the relative value of
potential policy gains and losses to the odds of being a non-beneficiary of the policy. Let
Πi(M1,M2) =
∑
W :i∈W π(W |M1,M2) denote i’s probability of being a beneficiary following
the lobbying choices M1 and M2. Legislator i’s expected payoff from passing the policy is
Upii (M1,M2) = Πi(M1,M2)H − (1 − Πi(M1,M2))L. Thus, vi(M1,M2) = 1 is optimal if and
only if
Upii (M1,M2) = Πi(M1,M2)H − (1−Πi(M1,M2))L ≥ 0
23I assume for the sake of convenience that legislators vote in favor of the policy when they are indifferent.
This assumption does not substantively affect the results.
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which is true if
H
L
≥ 1− Πi(M1,M2)
Πi(M1,M2)
. (3.5)
This formulation of the legislators’ decision-rules is used in all of the main results.
Since the costs of lobbying do not depend on the true set of policy beneficiaries,there are
uninformative equilibria that correspond to the “babbling” equilibria common to cheap talk
games: if the legislators believe that both interest groups will lobby uninformatively, neither
interest group has an incentive to be informative and therefore both groups will choose not
to lobby. When more informative equilibria exist, these equilibria are implausible: a lobbyist
who chose to babble when she could be influential would not remain a lobbyist for very long.
I therefore focus on equilibria that are optimal in the sense that the legislators believe that
each interest group will play the strategy that maximizes that group’s equilibrium payoff
given the strategy of the other interest group. For the rest of this paper, I will simply use
the word equilibrium to refer to perfect Bayesian equilibria that are optimal in this sense.
3.4 Analysis
In the analysis I characterize the equilibria to the game and demonstrate that interest group
influence in this environment is always bad for the ex ante welfare of the legislators. The
game has three categories of equilibria which depend on the prior probability distribution
over beneficiaries and on the relative values of the potential gains and losses from policy. In
a no influence equilibrium, G1 cannot persuade the legislators to implement the policy even
in the absence of competition from G2. In an influential equilibrium, G1 persuades the leg-
islators to implement the policy and G2 cannot credibly prevent that influence. Finally, in a
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No In uence In uenceBlocking
Figure 3.1: The figure displays equilibria of the lobbying game as a function of the ratio of
potential benefits of the proposed policy to the potential costs.
blocking equilibrium, competition between the interest groups prevents G1 from being influ-
ential. After characterizing each category of equilibrium I show how stricter supermajority
requirements may prevent interest group influence.
Figure 3.1 provides an overview of the results regarding the types of equilibria that can be
supported for some policy areas. The equilibria are defined by the ratio of the potential
benefits of the policy to the potential costs. When H/L is very small, the beneficiaries of the
project receive only a small payoff relative to the amount lost by non-beneficiaries. In those
cases, G1 is never influential. WhenH/L is large, the beneficiaries receive more relative to the
losses of the non-beneficiaries and G1 is influential even in the face of competition from G2.
Finally, when H/L is at an intermediate level, the presence of lobbying competition blocks
G1 from being influential when it would otherwise persuade the legislators to implement the
proposal. These three regimes are defined by two cutpoints which are labeled κ1(p, q) and
κ2(p, q) and are fully defined in the following sections.
3.4.1 Legislator welfare
Before getting into the details of the equilibria I present the main normative result which is
that the welfare effects of interest group influence must be negative. Since the analysis is
limited to interest groups that are purely vote-oriented in the sense that they are not moved
41
by the same information that moves legislators, the result should not be interpreted to mean
that all interest group influence must harm welfare. However, the result raises normative
concerns about the influence of for-profit lobbying firms and certain narrow business interests
in American politics.
The key fact that leads vote-oriented interest groups to harm welfare when they are influential
is that it is impossible for such a group to be only partially influential. If there is any
lobbying choice that leads the legislators to select such an interest group’s preferred policy,
then that interest group will always make that lobbying choice rather than one leading to an
unfavorable outcome, regardless of the nature of the group’s information. Lemma 4 shows
the consequence of this reasoning: all equilibria to the game induce the same policy choice in
every situation. Recall that, since I have assumed that the legislators initially do not wish to
pass the policy, an influential equilibrium to this game is one in which the policy sometimes
passes. Lemma 4 tells us that, in an influential equilibrium, the policy must always pass.
Lemma 4. In any equilibrium to the game, x∗(M1,M2) is constant.
In a game with only one legislator, Lemma 4 would imply that interests groups are never
influential: since the legislator knows that an interest group lobbyist will say whatever it
takes to sway the legislator to her side, the legislator would interpret lobbying choices as
being completely uninformative. However, in a collective choice setting lobbying can still be
interpreted as being informative because the lobbyist can choose to appeal to one coalition
rather than another.
As an example, suppose an environmentalist legislator is approached by an auto industry
lobbyist, who tells her “You should support increasing tariffs on Chinese cars to prevent an
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influx of vehicles with inferior emissions standards.” If that legislator were the only decision-
maker that could affect tariffs, she should dismiss the message on the basis that the lobbyist
would say anything to get her to support higher tariffs. However, in a legislative setting
the message may be credible. The legislator’s thought process might be: I know that the
industry lobbyist would say anything to get the legislature to support higher tariffs. However,
if the lobbyist’s information did not suggest that the Chinese cars adhered inferior emissions
standards, she most likely would not have lobbied me and would instead focus her efforts on
winning over labor and business oriented legislators. Thus, the legislator should interpret
the lobbyist’s message as credible.
The influence of interest groups in this environment therefore comes from manipulating
legislative coalitions. The harm to legislator welfare from this manipulation comes from the
conflict between the ex ante welfare of the legislators before the lobbyists walk through the
door and the ex post welfare of the legislators who are influenced by the lobbyist. Though
each legislator who is influenced has every incentive to vote in a way that is consistent with
the lobbyist’s recommendation, a legislator does not know at the beginning of the game
whether or not she will be one of the people lobbied. Furthermore, since the legislature did
not intially wish to pass the policy and the policy always passes in an influential equilibrium,
at least a winning coalition of legislators are worse off on average with interest group influence
than without it.
Theorem 4. Any influential equilibrium gives all legislators a lower ex ante expected utility
relative to the outcome when lobbying is not allowed.
The intuition driving the negative welfare result in Theorem 4 relates to Anscombe’s paradox
which states that, when a binary majority vote is taken over a series of issues, a majority
of the voters may be on the losing side on the majority of issues. This is one of many
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voting paradoxes that result from the cyclic nature collective preferences24 and the problem
extends to supermajority rules. Anscombe’s paradox illustrates just one way that a lobbyist
might manipulate a legislature. Each different coalition that the interest group may lobby
presents the legislature with a different “issue” or, more directly, a different lottery over
possible effects of the policy in question. Moreover, the lobbyist may present these issues
in such a way that most legislators lose out most of the time even though a majority (or
supermajority) prefers to follow the lobbyist’s advice on any given issue.
3.4.2 Interest group influence without competition
I now turn my attention to the positive implications of the model. I begin by characterizing
the conditions required for an interest group to be influential in the absence of any com-
petition. This is a useful benchmark against the results with competition but it is also a
substantively important case because one common path to lobbyist influence is to gravitate
toward narrow issue niches without substantial competition (Browne, 1990; Baumgartner
and Leech, 2001; Gray and Lowery, 1997).
Since a large number of distinct lobbying strategies can achieve the same effect in any
given situation, explicitly characterizing every equilibrium lobbying strategy is difficult and
uninformative. Instead, my approach is to establish necessary and sufficient conditions for
interest group influence by first establishing an upper bound on the expected utility that a
lobbyist can credibly offer a winning coalition of legislators and then by demonstrating that
there exists a lobbying strategy that achieves that upper bound. Thus, there is an influential
equilibrium if and only if, when the lobbyist promises the maximum credible expected utility
24See Nurmi (1999) for a thorough treatment of the topic of voting paradoxes.
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to the members of some winning coalition, the legislators in that winning coalition are willing
to approve the proposed policy. Lemma 5 establishes the relevant upper bound.
Lemma 5. In any equilibrium to the game with or without competition, following some
M1,M2 ∈ 2N , we have
Upii (M1,M2) ≤ H
n∑
k=0
pkmin
{
k
q
, 1
}
− L(1−
n∑
k=0
pkmin
{
k
q
, 1
}
)
for at least n− q legislators.
In other words, Lemma 5 says that the maximum probability that all members of a winning
coalition can assign to being a beneficiary of the policy is
∑n
k=0 pkmin
{
k
q
, 1
}
. Recall that
pk is the probability that the number of beneficiaries is k. Thus, in the best case scenario for
the lobbyist, a winning coalition of legislators are persuaded to compute their probability of
being a beneficiary according to the following reasoning after they are lobbied: Given that I
was lobbied, I believe that if there is a winning coalition that will benefit from the policy then
I am a beneficiary for sure. Otherwise, if the set of beneficiaries falls short of a winning
coalition, the probability of benefiting is evenly distributed among a minimal winning coalition
that includes myself.
The lobbying strategy defined below induces this reasoning among exactly q legislators fol-
lowing any lobbying choice. The strategy is called “minimal” because the lobbyist always
lobbies exactly a minimal winning coalition of legislators. The group lobbies only a mini-
mal winning coalition even if the set of true beneficiaries is much larger. At first glance it
seems counterintuitive that a group who always wants a policy to pass would ignore legis-
lators who would truly benefit from the policy even when it means they will vote against
the policy. However, there is no extra gain to passing a policy with an oversized coalition
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and if the group sometimes lobbied large coalitions then the legislators could infer that the
set of beneficiaries is small when the group only lobbies a minimal coalition. In contrast,
when a minimal strategy is used, the lobbying choices do not inform the legislators about
the number of beneficiaries. The minimal strategy is defined below.
Definition 1 (Minimal strategy for G1). A minimal strategy for G1 is a mixed strategy
σ∗1 : 2
N → ∆(2N) defined as follows:
σmin1 (M1|W ) =


(
p(W )
(
n−|W |
q−|W |
))−1
if |M1| = q and W ⊆ M1(
p(W )
(
|W |
q
))−1
if |M1| = q and W ⊃ M1
0 otherwise.
(3.6)
Though the minimal strategy provides some intuition about the incentives of the lobbyist
in this legislative setting, it is not a prediction about the lobbying strategy that in interest
group will use in any given situation. The minimal strategy is the most robust in the
sense that it allows interest group influence any time influence is possible. However, in a
given situation, it is likely that there are many other lobbying strategies lead to influential
equilibria. Thus, the strategies should not be interpreted as providing a point prediction
about which legislators should be lobbied by a given interest group. Notably, if the lobbyist
uses the minimal strategy, all of the legislators are equally likely to be lobbied.25 Thus, there
25To see this, note that the probability that i is lobbied is
∑
W :i∈W
∑
M :i∈M
p(W )σ(M |W ) =
∑
W :i∈W∧|W |<q
p(W )(p(W )
(
n− |W |
q − |W |
)
)−1+
∑
W :i∈W∧|W |≥q
p(W )(p(W )
(
n− |W |
q − |W |
)
)−1
which reduces to ∑
W :i∈W∧|W |<q
(
n− |W |
q − |W |
)−1
+
∑
W :i∈W∧|W |≥q
(
n− |W |
q − |W |
)−1
which is the same for all i.
46
is at least one equilibrium strategy for which the criticism of Hall and Deardorff does not
apply. In fact, when the environment does not require the lobbyist to use the most robust
strategy available, there will be equilibria in which the interest group more frequently lobbies
allies. Lemma 6 verifies that the minimal strategy described above implements the lobbyist’s
best case scenario by promising the maximum possible expected utility to a minimal winning
coalition of legislators.
Lemma 6. If G2 never lobbies and G1 uses the strategy σ
min
1 , for eachM1 such that |M1| = q,
we have
Upii (M1, ∅) = H
n∑
k=0
pkmin
{
k
q
, 1
}
− L
(
1−
n∑
k=0
pkmin
{
k
q
, 1
})
for all q of the legislators in M1.
To relate the expected utilities of the legislators from Lemma 6 to the decision rule described
in Equation 3.5, let
κ1(p, q) =
1−∑nk=0 pkmin{kq , 1}∑n
k=0 pkmin
{
k
q
, 1
} . (3.7)
The condition required for influence without competition is stated in Theorem 5.
Theorem 5. When there is no competition, G1 is influential if and only if
H
L
≥ κ1(p, q).
Though Theorem 5 does not make a prediction about who an interest group will lobby, it
does provide a prediction about when an interest group will lobby by defining which policy
issues are winnable. The legislature as a whole must be close enough to indifference in the
sense that, though the legislature would not approve the policy without lobbying, there are
enough expected benefits to go around that the lobbyist can make a good case.
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3.4.3 Blocking influence through competitive lobbying
Next, I focus on how competitive lobbying can alter the conditions under which an interest
group is influential. In some cases, the presence of competition between interest groups
eliminates the possibility of influence. However, if the distribution of expected benefits from
a policy are not too narrowly targeted and the expected loss from the policy is not too large,
an interest group can successfully influence the legislature to implement a new policy in the
presence of competition.
Assume that σ1 is a lobbying strategy in which G1 lobbies with positive probability. I will
say that G2 blocks the strategy σ1 if:
1. there exists a strategy σ2 such that σ2 is a best response to σ1 for some legislator
strategies that are consistent with Bayesian beliefs, and
2. given the same legislator strategies, σ1 is not a best response to σ2.
In other words, G2 blocks the strategy σ1 if there is a strategy that prevents σ1 from being
influential.
Clearly G2 blocks σ1 if there is a strategy by which G2 can always prevent the policy from
being implemented following every lobbying choice by G1 under σ1. Lemma 7 shows that
G2 also blocks σ1 if there is a strategy that prevents the policy from being implemented
following even one of the lobbying choices made by G1. The reasoning behind Lemma 7 is
as follows. Suppose that if G1 uses the strategy σ1 and that G2 has a strategy that could
prevent passage of the policy following some M˜1 in the support of σ1 but not necessarily
following any other lobbying choice by G1. Then G2 should play the strategy that prevents
passage whenever possible and choose not to lobby the rest of the time. However, this implies
48
that the policy never passes following M˜1, which means that G1 strictly prefers to deviate
to a strategy the places zero probability on M˜1.
Lemma 7. G2 blocks the strategy σ1 if there exists someM1 and σ2 such that
∑
W∈2N σ1(M1|W ) >
0 and x∗(M1,M2) = 0 for all M2 such that
∑
W∈2N σ2(M2|M1,W ) > 0.
Lemma 7 establishes the path to verifying the existence of a blocking equilibrium to the
game. If G2 can prevent passage of the policy following at least one lobbying choice given
any strategy by G1, then G2 blocks every possible strategy for σ1 and the prediction of
the game is a blocking equilibrium. Lemma 8 establishes an upper bound on the expected
policy payoff that G1 can always offer a winning coalition of legislators in the presence of
competition.
Lemma 8. For any lobbying strategy by G1, t here is a strategy for G2 such that for any
(M1,M2) on the equilibrium path U
pi
i (M1,M2) ≤ H
∑n
k=q pk − L
∑q−1
k=0 pk for at least n − q
legislators.
Thus, if G2 lobbies effectively it cannot be the case that there are always q or more legislators
who believe that they are beneficiaries of the policy with a probability higher than the total
probability that there are q or more beneficiaries. Given this result, it is now possible to
state a sufficient condition for a blocking equilibrium. Let
κ2(p, q) =
∑q−1
k=0 pk∑n
k=q pk
.
be the odds that the set of beneficiaries is smaller than q. I interpret κ2(p, q) as a measure
of the extent to which a policy area is targeted or broad in relation to the voting rule. If
κ2(p, q) is very high, the legislators believe that the benefits of the proposed policy are likely
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to be targeted to a small number of districts. This may represent lobbying over pork projects
or policies designed to satisfy a small ideological niche. In contrast, a low value of κ2(p, q)
is associated with a policy that is expected to be broad in the sense of appealing to a broad
coalition. As Theorem 6 establishes, competition between interest groups tends to eliminate
the possibility of influence in targeted policy areas but not necessarily in broad ones.
Theorem 6. There is a blocking equilibrium if
κ1(p, q) ≤ H
L
< κ2(p, q).
Theorem 6 establishes a necessary condition for G1 to be influential – the policy area must
be sufficiently broad that G2 cannot block every strategy. Theorem 7 establishes that the
same condition is also sufficient. When the expected distribution of benefits is sufficiently
broad compared to the ratio of potential gains and losses from the policy, the interest group
promoting the policy can influence the legislature even the presence of competition.
The blocking equilibria have a similar quality to the “jamming” that occurs in Minozzi’s
(2011) model of communication from two senders to a single decision-maker. In that model,
one sender employs a communication strategy designed to leave the decision-maker uncertain
about who has sent a truthful message. Here, competitive lobbying has a similar effect on
the legislators who are lobbied by both groups. These legislators believe that G1 is truthful
about the identity of the beneficiaries when the number of beneficiaries is large and that G2
is truthful when the number of beneficiaries is small. However, since they are not informed
about the size of the set of beneficiaries, they remain uncertain about which message should
be believed.
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Theorem 7. There exists an influential equilibrium in the presence of interest group com-
petition if
H
L
≥ κ2(p, q).
When interpreting Theorem 7, it is important to recognize that the condition depends on
three parameters of the game: the ratio of potential gains and losses from the policy, the prior
distribution over beneficiaries, and the voting rule. All three are important for the result. If
the potential gains to a policy are extremely small and the potential losses extremely large,
G1 may be unable to influence the legislature even if the policy is very broad as measured by
κ2(p, q). Furthermore, there exist prior distributions for which the policy would pass with no
lobbying any time H/L ≥ κ2(p, q), for instance if the policy is extremely targeted in the sense
that it almost certainly benefits only a minority of legislators. Finally, as Corollary 2 states,
stricter supermajority rules make influence more difficult. This is true without competition,
since κ1(p, q) increases with q, and with competition, since κ2(p, q) also increases in q.
Corollary 2. Increasing the supermajority rule reduces the set of circumstances leading to
influential equilibria. Influence is never possible under a unanimity rule (q = n).
Considering the welfare result of Theorem 4, this conclusion about voting rules provides a
rationale for stricter supermajority rules in some legislatures. Increasing the supermajority
rule can limit the welfare losses experienced by legislators as a result of manipulation by
interest groups. In fact, a common argument in favor of supermajority rules is that they
help prevent capture by special interests (McGinnis and Rappaport, 1998).
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3.5 Discussion
The model has many implications for interest group scholars and more generally for the
understanding of policy-making. In this section, I summarize some of the main insights from
the model regarding the nature of interest group influence.
Informational lobbying can be bad for legislators. The informational view of lob-
bying is often taken to mean that lobbyists provide a service to legislators that increases the
quality of representation. For instance, one of the seminal papers on informational lobbying
concludes that “a legislator will on average make ‘better’ decisions with lobbying than with-
out” (Austen-Smith and Wright, 1992, p. 229). Similarly, before applying the informational
lobbying framework to the analysis of the role of amici curiae briefs in the Supreme court,
Epstein and Knight (1999) summarize the argument for informational lobbying as follows:
Lobbyists provide information to MCs [Member of Congress] about consequences
of alternative courses of action (such as voting for or against a bill). With this in-
formation in hand, MCs can then make rational choices, that is, choices designed
to maximize their preference for reelection as opposed to electoral ouster. This
is one reason why reelection rates for MCs remain so high. Or so the argument
goes (p. 215).
My model suggests that the optimistic conclusions in the literature about interest group
influence are tied to the one-legislator models on which most of the literature is based.
When the models are adjusted to account for multiple legislators interacting in a collective
choice environment, the welfare gains from informational lobbying can be reversed. In fact,
as I demonstrate, if interest groups are purely vote-oriented then the effect of interest group
influence on legislator welfare is always negative.
52
Lobbying at the voting stage is most manipulative. I have focused on lobbying
that occurs at the voting stage of policy-making. This is a unique stage of the policy-making
process because it is the stage at which legislators are the least flexible. In fact, it is likely
that interest group influence is much more socially productive at the agenda-setting stage.
Austen-Smith (1993) presents a model in which interest groups can lobby at the agenda-
setting stage of policy-making in addition to the voting stage and shows that the prospects
for influence are generally greater at the agenda-setting stage.26 Furthermore, Bennedsen
and Feldmann (2002) show that majority voting creates opportunities for socially productive
informational lobbying prior to agenda-setting. Therefore, it may be most beneficial for
legislators to grant access to interest groups when policy proposals are being drafted and
legislators are deciding how to allocate their time and resources but deny them access during
floor votes.
Unfortunately, in some policy environments, most interest group influence is bound to occur
at the voting stage. For instance, Caldeira and Wright (1998) find evidence of lobbyist
influence on votes over confirmation of Supreme Court nominees. Interest groups are likely
less capable of influencing decisions over who to nominate given that access to the President
is more limited and potential nominees are vetted behind closed doors. Furthermore, agenda-
setting is often a function of external events that interest groups do not control. For instance,
gun control legislation is placed on the legislative agenda in response to mass shootings, and
changes in import tariffs are placed on the agenda in response to international negotiations
that happen outside of Congress.
The absence of lobbying does not imply the absence of impact. In some circum-
stances an interest group would never be influential with or without competition. In other
26In Austen-Smith’s (1993) model, interest group influence always improves the legislator’s welfare.
53
circumstances, the presence of competition between interest groups is the force that blocks a
particular interest group from becoming influential. These two situations are substantively
very different since the presence of an opposing interest group changes the final policy in
the latter case. Thus, the fact that an interest is represented by a group with the capabil-
ity to lobby improves the quality of representation for that group even when that group is
not actively lobbying. Unfortunately for empirical work on interest group influence, non-
influential equilibria and blocking equilibria are observationally equivalent. Thus, empirical
studies that look at policy outcomes as a function of lobbying activity may only provide a
lower bound on the extent of interest group influence in legislatures.
In the presence of interest group competition, targeted policies are more dif-
ficult to advocate than broad-based policies. My model predicts that, holding the
magnitude of the benefits and losses of the policy constant, competition between interest
groups should reduce the influence of interest group advocates of targeted policies but not
broad-based policies.
This prediction expands the insights of collective action models of interest group formation
which predict that targeted interests are more likely to gain interest group representation
(Olson, 1965). In international political economy, this argument is often cited as a reason that
protectionist interests gain lobbying representation at higher rates than free trade interests
(Ehrlich, 2008, 2007). Note that the definitions of broad and narrow policy areas in this
model are reciprocal: if the advocates of a policy represent a broad-based interest then
the opponents represent a targeted interest, and vice-versa. Thus, collective action models
suggest that interest groups are least likely to face competition in exactly the circumstances
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where my model suggests competition would be most effective in blocking the influence of
special interests.
3.6 Conclusion
I have analyzed a model of interest group influence on legislative voting through information
transmission. Unlike most models of informational lobbying, mine accounts for the spe-
cial incentives that collective choice institutions provide for lobbyists to manipulate voting
coalitions to their advantage. This form of lobbyist manipulation has stark implications for
legislator welfare: if interest group influence exists then it always has a negative effect on
welfare. Competition between interest groups may help eliminate this negative effect but
only for certain policy areas. In particular, interest group competition blocks the influence
of interest groups advocating very targeted policies but has no effect if the policy area is
sufficiently broad.
The model could be extended in several directions to increase the breadth of its empirical
applications. The model considers only one tool at lobbyists’ disposal: lobbying for support
once the bill is ready for a floor vote. Of course, lobbyists attempt to influence the policy-
making process at every stage of the process, including agenda-setting, drafting bills, and
affecting implementation by agencies. The negative welfare implications of interest group
influence in this model are driven in part by the fact that the legislature faces a take-it-or-
leave-it choice regarding whether to pass the bill. Furthermore, I have considered interest
groups that are purely vote-oriented in the sense that they are not moved by the same policy
information that moves legislators. Though this is a realistic assumption for many interest
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groups, others are clearly more directly policy-motivated and this should increase the chances
for welfare-enhancing interest group influence.
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Chapter 4
Directional Cheap Talk in Political
Campaigns
In order to make good choices, voters must rely at some level on the willingness of candidates
to transmit accurate information about their policy positions. Unfortunately, communica-
tion from candidates to voters is limited by the problem of credibility: because elections
incentivize candidates to say whatever it takes to win, voters ought to be skeptical of any
information provided by candidates. This insight corresponds to the popular intuition that
talk is cheap in politics and has lead to pessimism about the chances for meaningful voter
learning during electoral campaigns.
How does the credibility problem shape the qualitative nature of policy discussions during
the course of a campaign? Can candidates credibly communicate meaningful information
about their policy preferences to voters? Here, I develop a model of electoral campaigns
in multidimensional policy environments in which candidates and voters are each uncertain
about the preferences of the other players. In the model, two candidates send cheap talk
messages to voters prior to a majority election and, if elected, implement their most preferred
policy. In particular, the winning candidate is unconstrained by her campaign promises. I
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find that candidates can credibly reveal information about the direction (but not the dis-
tance) of their ideal points from the center of the space. Credibility problem constrains the
content of campaigns by causing voters to choose between candidates on the basis of direc-
tional information instead of immediate information about the level of preference divergence
between themselves and the candidates.
The analysis produces two main contributions. First, I show that campaigns are informative
even when candidates only engage in cheap talk. Since the seminal study of Crawford and
Sobel (1982) social scientists have understood that information transmission is only possible
when the speaker and the audience have shared interests. Candidates lack shared interests
with voters since they want to win the election even if informed voters would surely choose
their opponents, so early applications of cheap talk models to elections in simple policy
environments produced negative results on the impossibility of information transmission in
campaigns (Harrington, 1992). The observation that candidates lack credibility when talk is
cheap motivates theoretical studies in which institutions such as political parties (Snyder and
Ting, 2002) or repeated elections (Banks, 1990; Harrington, 1993) are posed as mechanisms
to make candidate communications believable by allowing costly signals that induce greater
shared interests between candidates and voters.27 This intuition also influences empirical
work on elections where the observation that politicians’ policies coincide with their campaign
messages is contrasted with the counterargument that campaigns are “just cheap talk.”28
27Banks (1990) uses a costly signaling model and uses retrospective voting in repeated elections as the
rationale for this choice. Callander and Wilkie (2007) allow candidates to have heterogeneous lying abilities
and find that the presence of liars (i.e. candidates for whom talk is cheap) affects the communication
strategies of all the candidates since honest candidates know that liars are tempted to imitate them. In that
game, the electoral process favors liars, though honest candidates win a significant proportion of elections.
28To cite two recent examples, the frontmatter of Sulkin’s (2011) book summarizes the main results as
showing that “contrary to the conventional wisdom that candidates’ appeals are just ‘cheap talk,’ campaigns
actually have a lasting legacy in the content of representatives’ and senators’ behavior in office.” And
Claibourn (2012) state that “empirical work on party platform fulfillment and presidential promise keeping
shows that these agenda priority signals are not cheap talk.”
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Though credibility imposes qualitative limitations on the ways that political issues are dis-
cussed in campaigns, credible communication is often not very limiting in terms of the
amount of information that candidates convey and the effect of campaigns on the quality of
voters’ decision-making. For example, if voters believe that candidates’ preferences on each
policy issue are equally variable and are uncorrelated with their positions on other policy
issues, credible directional communication in campaigns comes close, in a precise sense, to
full revelation of candidate preferences. More generally, the candidates can convey binary in-
formation (e.g. pro or con, yes or no, left or right) on each issue dimension in every situation
described by the model.
A second contribution of this study is to show how strategic communication structures the
selection and presentation of policy issues in campaigns. The model predicts that candidates
will reveal information about the direction in which they would change policy but not the
magnitude of those changes. For instance, a statement such as “I will reduce entitlements and
increase military spending” can be credible but not statements such as “I will cut entitlements
by 30% and increase military expenditures by 10%.” These directional campaign messages
lend a predictable structure to electoral cleavages – the voters supporting each candidate are
separated into two roughly equal sets by a plane passing through the center of the policy
space. Thus, both candidates appeal equally to a voter whose ideal point is exactly at the
center of the policy space and the candidates’ supporters form two cohesive voting groups
divided by a single plane.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 4.1 presents an overview of the argument using three
illustrative examples. Section 4.2 explains the general model and Section 4.3 presents the
results. Section 4.4 discusses some normative and positive implications of the model and
concludes.
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4.1 Overview of the argument
In this section, I summarize the intuition behind the main results before presenting the
model in full detail. The players have standard spatial preferences: a policy is represented
by a point in Euclidean space and each players’ policy preferences are maximized at her
ideal point. Each candidate’s ideal point is private information – unknown to the voters and
to the other candidate – and both candidates are also uncertain about the ideal points of
the voters. Unlike in the standard Downsian model, candidates cannot commit to policy
platforms – if elected, a candidate will simply implement her ideal point. However, prior to
the election, both candidates have the opportunity to send cheap talk messages to the voters
about their ideal points. Assume these message take the form “My ideal point is somewhere
in the set S” where S is a subset of policies.
Example 4. The main results can be seen as a generalization of the following one-dimensional
result. When the policy space is one-dimensional, suppose that the players believe that all
other players’ (both candidates’ and voters’) ideal points are drawn from a probability dis-
tribution that is symmetric around zero (for example, ideal points may be drawn from a
standard normal distribution or a uniform distribution on [-1, 1]).29 In this setting, there is
an equilibrium in which each candidate accurate reveals whether her ideal point lies to the
left or the right of zero. Thus, the candidates communicate directional information about
their preferences without revealing the intensity of their preferences in that direction.
To see why this is an equilibrium, consider what happens when one candidate announces
“My ideal point is left of center” and the other announces “My ideal point is right of center”
as displayed in Figure 4.1. Since the distribution of candidates’ ideal points is symmetric,
29A distribution with a density function f is symmetric in one-dimension if f(x) = f(−x) for all x ∈ R.
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Figure 4.1: A one-dimensional directional equilibrium from Example 4.
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the voters expect still expect the candidates to be equally extreme. As a result, left-of-
center voters prefer the left-wing candidate and right-of-center voters prefer the right-wing
candidate. Since the distribution of voters’ ideal points is also symmetric and the candidates
remain uncertain about voter preferences, this means that each candidate expects to win the
election with a probability of one-half. Thus, neither candidate has an incentive to deviate
to a dishonest campaign message. Furthermore, even though the candidates have the same
expected probability of winning before they know the voters’ ideal points, the voters gain
from campaign speech in expectation since ex post winner of the election is the candidate
that would move policy in the direction preferred by a majority of voters.
The remainder of this paper shows that the directional logic of strategic communication
in the one-dimensional model generalizes to multidimensional policy spaces. The general-
ization of the result to multiple dimensions involves more subtlety for two reasons. First,
though in a one-dimensional space there are only two directions away from the center (left
or right), in two or more dimensions there are an infinite number of directions away from the
center. Second, the results rely on symmetry in the distribution of ideal points and, while
symmetry is an unambiguous concept for one-dimensional distributions, there are many dif-
ferent generalizations of one-dimensional symmetry to multiple dimensions and each have
different implications for the directional information that candidates transmit. The following
examples demonstrate both points.
Example 5. Consider a city council election in which the two issues at stake are levels
of spending on parks and public transportation. Assume that all players’ ideal points are
distributed according to a multivariate normal distribution with a mean of (0, 0)′ and a
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covariance matrix equal to the 2× 2 identity matrix.30 That is, each player’s ideal point in
two dimensions consists of two numbers, each drawn independently from a standard normal
distribution. The direction of a candidate’s ideal point form the center in two dimensions is a
ray starting from (0, 0) and passing through the candidate’s ideal point. This is represented
by an angle, ranging from 0 to 2π when measured in radians and ranging from 0 to 360 when
measured in degrees. There is an equilibrium to this game in which each candidate perfectly
reveals this direction.
Two see why this is an equilibrium, suppose that the ideal points of Candidate A and Candi-
date B are as shown in Figure 4.2. The circles represent contours of the distribution of ideal
points, or sets of points with the same density. Suppose that both candidates reveal direc-
tions from the center represented by rays passing through their ideal points. Candidate A’s
message can be interpreted roughly as “I will cut spending on both parks and transportation,
but I will cut five times as much on parks as on transportation.” Similarly, Candidate B’s
message is interpreted as “I will increase spending on parks and transportation, but I will
only increase spending on transportation at two thirds the rate that I will increase spending
on parks.” Given this information, the voters expect the candidates to be equally extreme
in their chosen directions and therefore choose the candidate that would move policy in the
direction most similar to their own.31 Thus, the voters for each candidate are divided by a
line passing through the center which, because of the symmetry of the voter distribution,
divides the voter distribution exactly in half. Hence, each candidate expects to win the
election with a probability of one half. Furthermore, this holds for any two rays that the
30In this example and in Example 6, I assume that voters’ and candidates’ ideal points come from the
same distribution. I relax this assumption in the full model and the most stringent requirements regarding
distributional symmetry apply to the ideal points of the candidates rather than the voters.
31Specifically, they will choose the candidate for whom the angle enclosed by their ideal point and the ray
revealed by the candidate has the largest cosine, as is shown in the proof of Theorem 8.
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Figure 4.2: The directional equilibrium in Example 5.
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candidates may reveal, so it is an equilibrium for all candidates to fully reveal their directions
from the center.
The equilibrium in Example 5 involves a large degree of information transmission. In two or
more dimensions, revealing candidates’ directions from the center is close to full revelation
in the sense that voters’ beliefs about each candidate are concentrated on a set with zero
prior density that contains the true ideal point. This high level of information transmission
is made possible by the fact that the distribution of ideal points is neutral with respect to
direction – the probability density at a particular point depends only on the distance of that
point from the center and not on its direction. This property is known as spherical symmetry
and is the strongest generalization of the notion of symmetry to multivariate distributions.
As Example 6 demonstrates, when the distribution of ideal points violates this property
but satisfies weaker notions of symmetry, the equilibria are qualitatively similar but less
informative.
Example 6. Consider an election involving the same two issues as in Example 5 but in which
players’ preferences on the issues are correlated: people who support increasing spending on
parks tend to also support increasing spending on transportation and people who prefer cuts
in one program tend to prefer cuts in both. One interpretation of this correlation is that
there is some principal dimension (e.g. preferences for more or less government spending)
that explains preferences on both issues. To represent this idea, let ideal points be drawn
from a multivariate normal distribution with a mean of (0, 0) and a covariance matrix of

1 12
1
2
1

 .
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While the contours of the distribution in Example 5 were circles, the contours of the new
distribution are ellipses which are longer in the direction of the principal preference dimen-
sion. In this environment, it can no longer be an equilibrium for candidates to fully reveal
their directions from the center. The reason is that the directions of their ideal points now
contain some information about the extremity of the candidates and candidates who reveal
themselves to be more extreme are at a disadvantage.
However, there is an equilibrium in which the candidates imperfectly reveal directional in-
formation about their preferences. This equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 4.3. In this
equilibrium, there are four regions (labelled using Roman numerals) and the candidates
accurately reveal the regions containing their ideal points. These regions are defined by
rotating the axes until one axis represents the principal dimension explaining the correlation
in ideal points. In this new rotated space, the dimensions of the candidates’ ideal points
are uncorrelated, though they have different variances. The regions illustrated in Figure 4.3
represent the four quadrants of the space with respect to these rotated axes. Like the rays
in Example 6, these sets give the candidates an equal expected distance to the center from
the perspective of voters. As a result, the voters for each candidate are once again divided
in half according to their preferences over the direction of the new policy from the center.
Thus, for any pair of quadrants that the candidates reveal, both candidates expect to win
the election with a probability of one half.
4.2 The model
I consider a model of an election in which candidates are unable to commit to policy plat-
forms. Candidates send campaign messages to convey information to voters about their
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Figure 4.3: The partially revealing directional equilibrium in Example 6.
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policy intentions. The policy space is Rd, with d ≥ 1. The set of players consists of two
candidates, denoted A and B, and a finite set N with an odd number n of voters. The
ideal policy of each player i ∈ A ∪ B ∪ N is denoted zi ∈ Rd. Each player’s preferences are
represented by a quadratic Euclidean utility function u(x, zi) = −||x− zi||2 where x is the
policy that is implemented and || · || is the Euclidean norm.
The election proceeds as follows. First, both candidates send costless and public campaign
messages mA,mB ∈ Rd to the voters about their policy preferences.32 Second, the voters
observe the messages, update their beliefs about the ideal points of the candidates, and each
voter votes in favor of one of the candidates. Finally, the candidate with the majority of
votes wins the election and implements her ideal policy.
Each player’s ideal point is private information. The players believe that the candidates’
ideal points are independently and identically distributed from a continuous probability dis-
tribution with density f(z) = c ·f0(z′Σ−1z) where f0 is continuous and non-negative and the
scale parameter Σ is a real, symmetric, positive definite d× d matrix and c is a normalizing
constant. This implies that f is elliptically symmetric around the point (0, . . . , 0) (Fang,
Kotz and Ng, 1990). The players believe that the voters’ ideal points are independently and
identically distributed according to a probability measure G. I assume that G is angularly
symmetric about (0, . . . , 0), which means that zi/||zi|| and −zi/||zi|| have the same distri-
bution or, equivalently, that any hyperplane passing through (0, . . . , 0) will divide Rd into
two half-spaces with equal probability under G.33
32The main existence results do not depend on whether the candidates’ messages are simultaneous or
sequential so I leave this aspect of the model open to interpretation.
33This definition is due to Liu (1988). The assumptions on the distribution of voters’ ideal points are
weaker than the assumptions on candidates’ ideal points in that all elliptically symmetric distributions are
also angularly symmetric, but both forms of symmetry are satisfied by any multivariate normal distribution
and a variety of others. For an overview of these and other notions of multivariate symmetry in probability
distributions, see Serfling (2004).
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I consider symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibria in weakly undominated strategies. A strat-
egy for the candidates is a function σ : Rd → Rd mapping each possible ideal point into
a campaign message. Thus, if σ(z) = m means that a candidate with an ideal point of z
sends the message m. The focus on symmetric equilibria means that candidates A and B
would send identical messages if they had the same ideal point. A strategy for each voter is
a function v : (Rd)3 → [0, 1] mapping the voter’s ideal point and both candidates’ messages
into a probability of voting for candidate A. For example, if v(zi,mA,mB) = 1, then a
voter with ideal point zi votes for candidate A with probability 1 when the candidates send
the message mA and mB. The focus on weakly undominated strategies means that voters
always choose the candidate that, if elected, would give them the highest expected utility.
This rules outthe possibility that voters choose their least-favored candidate when they are
not pivotal. Finally, let µ(m) denote the beliefs of the voters about the ideal point of a
candidate who sends the message m. Voters’ beliefs about a candidate depend only on that
candidate’s message.
An equilibrium to the game is a strategy profile in which:
1. σ(z) maximizes each candidate’s probability of winning the election given that the
voters’ play v and the other candidate plays σ,
2. v(zi,mA,mB) = 1 if A gives a voter with ideal point zi a higher expected utility under
beliefs µ, v(zi,mA,mB) = 0 if B gives that voter a higher expected utility under beliefs
µ, and v(zi,mA,mB) = 1/2 if the expected utilities for a voter with ideal point zi are
equal for both candidates under beliefs µ, and
3. µ is consistent with Bayes’ rule: letting S(m) = {z ∈ Rd : σ(z) = m}, we have
µ(m) = f(x)/[
∫
S(m)
f(x)] whenever S(m) is non-empty.
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The meanings of the candidates’ messages are determined only by the sets of types who
would send those messages in equilibrium. Therefore, the analysis is concerned with the the
sets S(m) induced by the messages rather than the messages themselves. If S(m) = S, the
message m is meant to convey the information “My ideal point is somewhere in the set S.”
In reality, the candidate would likely use more natural language such as “I am economically
liberal and socially conservative” or “I prefer to increase spending on food stamps twice as
much as on science funding.” The effect of these messages is to inform the voter by reducing
the set of preferences that the candidate might hold.
4.3 Results
The results mirror the examples in Section 4.1. Section 4.3.1 shows that if the distribution
of candidates’ ideal points is spherically symmetric (as in Example 5) then there is an
equilibrium in which candidates fully reveal the direction of their ideal points from the
center. Section 4.3.2 shows that there always exists an equilibrium in which candidates
reveal the orthants containing an orthogonal rotation of their ideal points, as in Example 6.
4.3.1 Directional communication
The direction of an ideal point z = (z1, z2, . . . , zd) ∈ Rd is a vector of numbers φ(z) =
(φ1(z), . . . , φd−1(z)) such that
zi = ||z||
∏
j<i
sin φj(z) cosφi(z)
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for all i ∈ {1, . . . , d− 1} and
zd = ||z||
∏
j<d
sinφj(z).
These are the angular components of the hyperspherical coordinates of z. The function φ(z)
determines which point on the unit sphere lies on the same ray from the origin as the point
z.
A directional communication equilibrium is one in which the candidates fully reveal the di-
rection of their ideal point and nothing more. Since the specific messages chosen by the
candidate are not of interest, it is convenient to consider candidate strategies that place
positive probability only on messages on the unit hypersphere. Thus, a directional com-
munication equilibrium is one in which S(m) = {z ∈ Rd : φ(z) = φ(m)} if ||m|| = 1
and S(m) = ∅ otherwise. In a directional communication equilibrium, voters’ beliefs are
concentrated on a ray starting from the origin and pointing in the direction of m.
Theorem 8. There exists a directional communication equilibrium if Σ = kId where k > 0
is a constant scalar and Id is the identity matrix.
In a one-dimensional policy space, the equilibrium described in Theorem 8 corresponds to
the equilibrium from Example 4 in which the candidates reveal whether their ideal point
is to the left or to the right of the center. In multidimensional policy spaces, a directional
communication equilibrium implies nearly complete information transmission in the sense
that voters’ beliefs are concentrated on very small sets. The interpretation of directional
communication as being close to full revelation is supported by Corollary 3.
Corollary 3. If d > 1 and Σ = kId then there exists and equilibrium in which voters’ beliefs
about candidates are concentrated on sets with measure zero containing the the candidates’
true ideal points.
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Directional equilibria clearly fall short of full revelation in other ways. Voters are unable
to distinguish between moderate and extreme candidates. Therefore, there is a chance that
voters will make mistakes. However, the winner of the election will be the candidate who
would move policy in the direction preferred by the majority of voters.
4.3.2 Principal orthant communication
Let QΛQ−1 = Σ be an eigendecomposition of the matrix Σ, where Λ is a diagonal matrix
with the diagonal elements equal to the eigenvalues of Σ, and the columns of Q are the
corresponding eigenvectors. This decomposition is useful because the any two dimensions
in the distribution of Qz are orthogonal. Furthermore, Q can be chosen to be a rotation
matrix so that Qz can be interpreted as the coordinates of z when the axes of the space are
rotated according to the eigenvalues of Σ. These new axes represent, in statistical parlance,
the principal components of the distribution f and, in geometric terms, the principal axes
of the ellipsoids formed by the contours of f .
I define the principal orthant of z as the set of points z˜ ∈ Rd such that Qz and Qz˜ have the
same sign on every dimension. There always exists an equilibrium in which the candidates
reveal the principal orthant of their ideal points. Since the particular messages used by
the candidates are unimportant, I restrict attention to messages consisting of a sequence
numbers equal to −1 or 1. A principal orthant equilibrium is one in which S(m) = {z ∈
R
d :m · z >> 0} if m ∈ {−1, 1}d and S(m) = ∅ otherwise.
Theorem 9. There exists a principal orthant equilibrium.
Theorem 9 implies that there is always an equilibrium that partitions the policy space into
2d convex sets. Since all ideal points along the same ray from the origin belong to the same
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principal orthant, principal orthant equilibria partially reveal the direction of each candidate
from the center. Thus, though less informative, principal orthant equilibria are qualitatively
similar to directional communication.
Assuming the principal components of the ideal point distributions are well-understood by
the voters, principal orthant equilibria are easily understood by the voters since they corre-
spond to statements such as “I am socially conservative and economically liberal.” In fact,
since the principal components explain the most variance in political preferences, there is
reason to believe that these dimensions are the most likely to correspond to how voters think
about politics. In fact, this is the motivation behind principal components analysis, factor
analysis, and related methods which have been used to measure voters’ political ideology
in empirical work for decades (Schofield, Gallego and Jeon, 2011; Enelow and Hinich, 1984;
Aldrich and McKelvey, 1977).
4.4 Discussion
In this section I discuss the normative and positive implications of the model and situate
the results in the existing literature.
4.4.1 Welfare implications
Though the candidates believe they have the same probability of victory, the actual winner
of the election gives a higher expected utility to a majority of voters. Cheap talk can improve
voters’ welfare in this model because of the assumption that candidates are uncertain about
the preferences of the voters. Thus, candidates can provide information that is useful to
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the voters and this information is credible because it does not change the candidates’ beliefs
about the probability that they win the election. Though candidates may be willing to say
anything it takes to win, productive communication is still possible when candidates cannot
be sure precisely what they should say to be elected.
4.4.2 Implications for existing theoretical work
Compared to previous work, this study is considerably more optimistic about the prospects
for successful cheap talk in electoral campaigns. Early results suggested that information
transmission does not occur when candidate messages are cheap talk. For instance, Har-
rington (1992) presented a model of cheap talk campaigns in a one-dimensional environment
and showed that information transmission does not occur. Banks’s (1990) study of campaign
communication in a one-dimensional policy space focused on the case of costly signals, but
showed that there is no information transmission when signaling costs are close to zero. In
informal work on elections, “cheap talk” is basically a synonym for meaningless communi-
cation.
Since cheap talk communication was unsuccessful in these settings, political scientists have
focused on electoral signaling models in which obfuscation is costly. For example, an in-
formational rationale for political parties is that party screening mechanisms induce costly
signals that allow candidates to communicate their preferences to voters (Snyder and Ting,
2002; Ashworth and de Mesquita, 2008). I do not dispute the empirical realism of these
models. Certainly not all campaign communication is cheap talk. However, a the theoretical
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contribution of this study is to show that institutions that provide costly signals are not nec-
essary for sustaining information transmission in elections. In the richer policy environment
considered in this study, campaign talk is meaningful without being costly.
Methodologically, this study is related to recent work on multidimensional cheap talk, which
has generally shown that the opportunities for information transmission can be greatly im-
proved when information is multidimensional compared to it is unidimensional (Battaglini,
2002; Chakraborty and Harbaugh, 2007, 2010). In my model, the equilibrium of the mul-
tidimensional game is similar in character to the one-dimensional equilibrium, though the
information revealed may appear more meaningful in many dimensions than in one.34
The contrast in my model between spherically symmetric (Theorem 8) and merely ellipti-
cally symmetric (Theorem 9) candidate distributions corresponds to the observation about
multidimensional cheap talk made by Levy and Razin (2007):
Generally, communication on one dimension may reveal information on others.
Therefore, even when the two players have no conflict on a particular dimension,
such informational spillovers may restrict their ability to communicate (885).
This argument describes why directional information is fully transmitted in the spherical
case of Theorem 8 and not in other cases. On average, candidates have no conflict with
voters when it comes to the direction of their ideal point since a voter at the center is
indifferent about which direction policy is set from the center. However, if the distribution
of candidates is not spherically symmetric, information about the direction of a candidate’s
ideal point spills over into information about the extremity of that candidate.
34For instance, perfectly revealing a candidate’s direction divides the space in half in the one-dimensional
model and into sets with measure zero in the multidimensional model. Similarly, revealing “pro versus con”
information in one dimension corresponds to a modest level of information transmission while revealing the
same level of information on 20 different issues conveys considerable information about a candidate.
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4.4.3 Empirical implications
The model has several empirical implications. First, the model makes qualitative predic-
tions about the ways that candidates are likely to discuss their positions on political issues.
Specifically, the information that candidates convey should inform voters about the direction
in which they would like to move policy while leaving voters uncertain about their distance
from the center of the policy space.
The directional nature of information in my theory corresponds well to work on voting
behavior which claims that voters appear to engage in directional rather than proximity
(spatial) voting (Rabinowitz and Macdonald, 1989). According to this argument, citizens
respond to political objects in terms of direction rather than proximity. Though proponents
of directional voting theories interpreted these ideas as implying that “the traditional spatial
theory of elections is seriously flawed” (p. 114), my theory shows why voting would appear
directional even if voters have standard spatial preferences. Here, voting appears directional
not because of psychological characteristics of voters but because only directional information
can be credibly communicated by candidates.
Second, the model provides some microfoundations for the way empirical researchers oper-
ationalize ideology in the spatial model of voting. For many years, political scientists have
employed psychometric methods related to principal components analysis and factor anal-
ysis to measure political preferences. These methods involve performing a singular value
decomposition on the correlation matrix of the data (e.g. answers to issue questions on a
survey) and describing preferences along the dimensions corresponding to some number of
eigenvectors, called factors in factor analysis. The justification for this approach is that these
eigenvectors correspond to orthogonal dimensions that are ordered according to the amount
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of variance each explains in the data. In my theory, the candidates transform the space in
exactly the same way in order to reveal information to voters about their preferences. The
reason is that candidates can more easily communicate directional information about their
preferences along orthogonal dimensions, because voters expect candidates in each orthant
to be equally extreme.
The various normative and positive implications arising from the model indicate the advan-
tages of analyzing the incentives for candidates to communicate policy information to voters
in multidimensional policy spaces. The formal theory literature on incomplete information
in elections has neglected this task even though most elections involve the consideration
of multiple policy issues. My model is purposely simple, involving very little institutional
detail other than majority rule. Inclusion of institutions such as repeated elections to induce
reputation concerns would likely enhance the opportunities for productive communication.
Similarly, the inclusion of (costly) informative party labels would improve prospects for in-
formation transmission in multiple dimensions as it does in one-dimensional models.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
I have analyzed three models of communication in collective choice environments. In all
of the models, the communicators possess private information that determines the effects of
different choices available to the members of a collective choice body. Furthermore, the effects
of the choices in each model are multidimensional, so that collective preferences over the
effects are not necessarily transitive. In each situation, the opportunities for communication
are expanded relative to settings with a single recipient of information. In my model of
political campaigns, these new opportunities for communication work to the benefit of the
voters. In the other models, additional opportunities for communication come in the form
of manipulative persuasion that harms voters’ welfare. The results show that strategic
information transmission is substantially different when the audience is a collective choice
body rather than a single decision-maker.
The models leave many questions open for future research. In all of the models in this
dissertation, the voters face a choice between only two alternatives. I neglect the issue of
agenda-setting and assume that the players have no proposal power. It is possible that some
of the negative welfare implications of expert manipulation would be eliminated or reversed
if voters could modify proposals prior to voting. In a dynamic model with multidimensional
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policies involving communication and proposal power, Meirowitz (2007a) proves that out-
comes converge to the core of the voting rule if one exists. However, as Chapter 1 suggests,
communication strategies are very different in the absence of a core. The effects of commu-
nication on voter welfare in the absence of a core when proposals can be modified is still
unknown.
The voters and legislators in my models possess no private information of their own. In
that way, my models differ from models of deliberation and debate in which all voters have
opportunities to transmit information (Meirowitz, 2007b; Austen-Smith, 1990; Austen-Smith
and Feddersen, 2006b). Future research may reveal how similar deliberative processes operate
in multidimensional environments like those considered in this dissertation.
A broader normative problem related to my theoretical framework is one of institutional
design: How should institutions be designed to efficiently aggregate preferences and take
advantage of agents’ varying expertise? As my research suggests, such institutions must
account for the special difficulties that arise when communication and voting are combined
in complex policy-making environments.
79
References
Ainsworth, Scott. 1993. “Regulating Lobbyists and Interest Group Influence.” The Journal
of Politics 55(1):pp. 41–56.
Aldrich, John H. and Richard D. McKelvey. 1977. “A Method of Scaling with Applica-
tions to the 1968 and 1972 Presidential Elections.” The American Political Science Review
71(1):pp. 111–130.
Alonzo, Ricardo and Odilon Caˆmara. 2014. “Persuading Voters.” Working Paper .
Anscombe, G. E. M. 1976. “On Frustration of the Majority by Fulfilment of the Majority’s
Will.” Analysis 36(4):pp. 161–168.
Arrow, Kenneth J. 1951. Social Choice and Individual Values. New York, NY: John Wiley
and Sons.
Ashworth, Scott and Ethan Bueno de Mesquita. 2008. “Informative Party Labels With
Institutional and Electoral Variation.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 20(3):251–273.
Austen-Smith, David. 1990. “Information Transmission in Debate.” American Journal of
Political Science 34(1):pp. 124–152.
Austen-Smith, David. 1993. “Information and Influence: Lobbying for Agendas and Votes.”
American Journal of Political Science 37(3):pp. 799–833.
80
Austen-Smith, David and Jeffrey S. Banks. 2000. Positive Political Theory I: Collective
Preference. University of Michigan Press.
Austen-Smith, David and John R. Wright. 1994. “Counteractive Lobbying.” American
Journal of Political Science 38(1):pp. 25–44.
Austen-Smith, David and JohnR. Wright. 1992. “Competitive lobbying for a legislator’s
vote.” Social Choice and Welfare 9(3):229–257.
Austen-Smith, David and Timohy J. Feddersen. 2006a. “Deliberation, Preference Uncer-
tainty, and Voting Rules.” American Political Science Review null:209–217.
Austen-Smith, David and Timothy J. Feddersen. 2006b. “Deliberation, Preference Uncer-
tainty, and Voting Rules.” The American Political Science Review 100(2):pp. 209–217.
Austen-Smith, David and William H. Riker. 1987. “Asymmetric Information and the Co-
herence of Legislation.” The American Political Science Review 81(3):pp. 897–918.
Banks, Jeffrey S. 1990. “A model of electoral competition with incomplete information.”
Journal of Economic Theory 50(2):309 – 325.
Banks, Jeffrey S. and John Duggan. 2000. “A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice.” The
American Political Science Review 94(1):pp. 73–88.
Banks, Jeffrey S. and John Duggan. 2006. “A Social Choice Lemma on Voting Over Lotteries
with Applications to a Class of Dynamic Games.” Social Choice and Welfare 26(2):285–304.
Baron, David P. and Alexander V. Hirsch. 2012. “Common agency lobbying over coalitions
and policy.” Economic Theory 49(3):639–681.
Battaglini, Marco. 2002. “Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk.” Econo-
metrica 70(4).
81
Baumgartner, Frank R. and Beth L. Leech. 2001. “Interest Niches and Policy Bandwag-
ons: Patterns of Interest Group Involvement in National Politics.” The Journal of Politics
63(4):pp. 1191–1213.
Bennedsen, Morten and Sven E. Feldmann. 2002. “Lobbying Legislatures.” Journal of
Political Economy 110(4):pp. 919–946.
Blume, Andreas and Joel Sobel. 1995. “Communication-Proof Equilibria in Cheap-Talk
Games.” Journal of Economic Theory 65(2):359–382.
Browne, William P. 1990. “Organized Interests and Their Issue Niches: A Search for
Pluralism in a Policy Domain.” The Journal of Politics 52(2):pp. 477–509.
Caillaud, Bernard and Jean Tirole. 2007. “Consensus Building: How to Persuade a Group.”
The American Economic Review 97(5):pp. 1877–1900.
Caldeira, Gregory A. and John R. Wright. 1998. “Lobbying for Justice: Organized Interests
Supreme Court Nominations, and United States Senate.” American Journal of Political
Science 42(2):pp. 499–523.
Callander, Steven and Simon Wilkie. 2007. “Lies, damned lies, and political campaigns.”
Games and Economic Behavior 60(2):262–286.
Chakraborty, Archishman and Rick Harbaugh. 2007. “Comparative cheap talk.” Journal
of Economic Theory 132(1):70–94.
Chakraborty, Archishman and Rick Harbaugh. 2010. “Persuasion by Cheap Talk.” Ameri-
can Economic Review 100(5):2361–82.
Claibourn, Michele P. 2012. “Hearing Campaign Appeals: The Accountability Implications
of Presidential Campaign Tone.” Political Communication 29(1):64–85.
82
Cotton, Christopher. 2012. “Pay-to-play politics: Informational lobbying and contribution
limits when money buys access.” Journal of Public Economics 96(34):369 – 386.
Crawford, Vincent P and Joel Sobel. 1982. “Strategic Information Transmission.” Econo-
metrica 50(6):1431–51.
Ehrlich, Sean D. 2007. “Access to Protection: Domestic Institutions and Trade Policy in
Democracies.” International Organization 61:571–605.
Ehrlich, Sean D. 2008. “The Tariff and the Lobbyist: Political Institutions, Interest Group
Politics, and U.S. Trade Policy.” International Studies Quarterly 52(2):427–445.
Enelow, J.M. and M.J. Hinich. 1984. The Spatial Theory of Voting: An Introduction.
Cambridge University Press.
Epstein, Lee and Jack Knight. 1999. “Mapping out the strategic terrain: The informational
role of amici curiae.” Supreme Court decision-making: New institutionalist approaches
pp. 215–235.
Fang, Kai-Tai, Samuel Kotz and Kai Wang Ng. 1990. Symmetric multivariate and related
distributions. Number 36 in “Monographs on statistics and applied probability” London,
UK: Chapman & Hall.
Fernandez, Raquel and Dani Rodrik. 1991. “Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the
Presence of Individual- Specific Uncertainty.” The American Economic Review 81(5):pp.
1146–1155.
Gibbard, Allan. 1973. “Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result.” 41(4):587–601.
83
Gilligan, Thomas W. and Keith Krehbiel. 1987. “Collective Decisionmaking and Standing
Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures.” Journal
of Law, Economics, & Organization 3(2):287–335.
Gilligan, Thomas W. and Keith Krehbiel. 1989. “Asymmetric Information and Legislative
Rules with a Heterogeneous Committee.” American Journal of Political Science 33:295–314.
Gilligan, Thomas W. and Keith Krehbiel. 1990. “Organization of Informative Committees
by a Rational Legislature.” American Journal of Political Science 34(2):pp. 531–564.
Gray, Virginia and David Lowery. 1997. “Life in a Niche: Mortality Anxiety among Orga-
nized Interests in the American States.” Political Research Quarterly 50(1):pp. 25–47.
Grossman, G.M. and E. Helpman. 2001. Special Interest Politics. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.
Hall, Richard L. and Alan V. Deardorff. 2006. “Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy.” The
American Political Science Review 100(1):pp. 69–84.
Harrington, Joseph E. 1992. “Modelling the role of information in elections.” Mathematical
and Computer Modelling 16(89):133 – 145.
Harrington, Joseph E. 1993. “The Impact of Reelection Pressures on the Fulfillment of
Campaign Promises.” Games and Economic Behavior 5(1):71 – 97.
Hirsch, Alexander V. and Kenneth W. Shotts. 2012. “Policy-Specific Information and
Informal Agenda Power.” American Journal of Political Science 56(1):67–83.
Jackson, Matthew O. and Xu Tan. 2012. “Deliberation, disclosure of information, and
voting.” Journal of Economic Theory (0).
84
Kalandrakis, Tasos. 2006. “Proposal Rights and Political Power.” American Journal of
Political Science 50(2):441–448.
Kamenica, Emir and Matthew Gentzkow. 2011. “Bayesian Persuasion.” American Eco-
nomic Review 101(6):2590–2615.
Krehbiel, Keith. 1991. Information and Legislative Organization. Vol. Michigan s University
of Michigan Press.
Levy, Gilat and Ronny Razin. 2007. “On the Limits of Communication in Multidimensional
Cheap Talk: A Comment.” Econometrica 75(3):885–893.
Liu, Regina Y. 1988. “On a notion of simplicial depth.” Proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences 85(6):1732–1734.
Lohmann, Susanne. 1995. “Information, Access, and Contributions: A Signaling Model of
Lobbying.” Public Choice 85(3/4):pp. 267–284.
Lupia, Arthur and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1998. The Democratic Dilemma : Can Citizens
Learn What They Need to Know? Cambridge University Press.
Macci, Claudio. 1996. “On the Lebesgue decomposition of the posterior distribution with
respect to the prior in regular Bayesian experiments.” Statistics & Probability Letters
26(2):147–152.
McGinnis, John O and Michael B Rappaport. 1998. “Supermajority rules as a constitutional
solution.” Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 40:365.
McKelvey, Richard D. 1976. “Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some
implications for agenda control.” Journal of Economic Theory 12(3):472 – 482.
85
Meirowitz, Adam. 2007a. “Communication and bargaining in the spatial model.” Interna-
tional Journal of Game Theory 35:251–266.
Meirowitz, Adam. 2007b. “In Defense of Exclusionary Deliberation: Communication and
Voting with Private Beliefs and Values.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 19(3):301–327.
Minozzi, William. 2011. “A Jamming Theory of Politics.” The Journal of Politics 73:301–
315.
Nakamura, K. 1979. “The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences.” International
Journal of Game Theory 8:55–61.
Neumann, John Von and Oskar Morgenstern. 1944. Theory of Games and Economic Be-
havior. Princeton University Press.
Nurmi, Hannu. 1999. Voting Paradoxes and How to Deal with Them. Heidelberg, Germany:
Springer.
Olson, Mancur. 1965. The logic of collective action : public goods and the theory of groups.
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Penn, Elizabeth Maggie, John W. Patty and Sean Gailmard. 2011. “Manipulation and
Single-Peakedness: A General Result.” American Journal of Political Science 55(2):436–
449.
Potters, Jan and Frans Van Winden. 1990. “Modelling political pressure as transmission of
information.” European Journal of Political Economy 6(1):61 – 88.
Potters, Jan and Frans Winden. 1992. “Lobbying and asymmetric information.” Public
Choice 74(3):269–292.
86
Rabinowitz, George and Stuart Elaine Macdonald. 1989. “A Directional Theory of Issue
Voting.” The American Political Science Review 83(1):pp. 93–121.
Riker, William H. 1986. The Art of Political Manipulation. New Haven: Yale University
Press.
Satterthwaite, Mark A. 1975. “Strategy-Proofness and Arrow´ıs Conditions: Existence and
Correspondence Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare Functions.” 10:187–
217.
Schattschneider, E.E. 1947. Party government... New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart and Win-
ston.
Schnakenberg, Keith E. 2014. “Expert Policy Advice to a Voting Body.” Working Paper .
Schofield, Norman. 1983. “Generic Instability of Majority Rule.” The Review of Economic
Studies 50(4):pp. 695–705.
Schofield, Norman, Maria Gallego and JeeSeon Jeon. 2011. “Leaders, voters and activists
in the elections in Great Britain 2005 and 2010.” Electoral Studies 30(3):484 – 496. Special
Symposium on the Politics of Economic Crisis.
Serfling, Robert J. 2004. Multivariate Symmetry and Asymmetry. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Shepsle, KennethA. and BarryR. Weingast. 1981. “Structure-induced equilibrium and leg-
islative choice.” Public Choice 37(3):503–519.
Snyder, James M., Jr. and Michael M. Ting. 2002. “An Informational Rationale for Political
Parties.” American Journal of Political Science 46(1):pp. 90–110.
Sulkin, Tracy. 2011. The Legislative Legacy of Congressional Campaigns. The Legislative
Legacy of Congressional Campaigns Cambridge University Press.
87
Wright, J.R. 1996. Interest groups and Congress: lobbying, contributions, and influence.
New topics in politics Allyn and Bacon.
88
Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1 Proofs of results
For the first few results in this section I allow for mixed voting strategies. Let Vi : Ω→ [0, 1]
be a mixed voting strategy that maps messages into probabilities of voting “Yes.” Let V be
a profile of such strategies and D − {C1, . . . , CK}. The probability that the proposal passes
following a message s ∈ Ω given the profile V of voting strategies is
χ(s, V ) =
K∑
h=1

(−1)h−1 ∑
D∗⊂D:|D∗|=h
∏
i∈D∗
Vi(s)

 . (A.1)
Lemma 9. Assume (σ, V ) is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in weakly undominated strate-
gies. For any s ∈ Ω, if χ(s, V ) ∈ (0, 1), there is some C ∈ D such that Eµs [ωi] ≥ 0 for all
i ∈ C.
Proof. For any i ∈ N , in weakly undominated strategies Vi(s) ∈ (0, 1) implies that Eµs [ωi] =
0 and Vi(s) = 1 implies that Eµs [ωi] ≥ 0. Since χ(s, V ) > 0, we must have some C ∈ D such
that Vi(s) > 0 for all i ∈ C, which proves that Eµs [ωi] ≥ 0 for all i ∈ C.
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Lemma 10. Assume (σ, V ) is perfect Bayesian equilibrium in weakly undominated strategies
and let P χ = {p ∈ [0, 1] : ∃s ∈ Ω such that χ(s, V ) = p}, we have: (a) ωE > 0⇒ χ(s, V ) =
maxP χ for all s such that σ(s|ω) > 0 and (b) ωE < 0 ⇒ χ(s, V ) = minP χ for all s such
that σ(s|ω) > 0
Proof. To prove (a), assume ωE > 0 and χ(s, V ) 6= maxP χ. Then there exists s ∈ Ω such
that χ(s, V ) > χ(s, V ), which implies that E receives a strictly higher payoff from playing
s, so (σ, V ) is not an equilibrium. To prove (b), assume ωE < 0 and χ(s, V ) 6= minP χ.
Then there exists s ∈ Ω such that χ(s, V ) < χ(s, V ) which implies that E strictly prefers to
deviate to s, so (σ, V ) is not an equilibrium.
Lemma 11. For all (σ, v∗), if x∗(s|v∗,D) is constant for all s ∈ Ω then (σ, v∗) is not D-
preferred.
Proof. If x∗(s|v∗,D) = 0 then U∗i (σ, v∗) = 0 for all i ∈ N and (σ, v∗) is not D-preferred. Let
x∗(s|v∗,D) = 1. Then U∗i (σ, v∗) = Eµ0 [ωi]x∗(s|v∗,D). Since x = 0 is chosen in the babbling
equilibrium, there exists C ∈ D such that 0 ≥ Eµ0 [ωi]x∗(s|v∗,D) for all i ∈ C. Thus, (σ, v∗)
is not D-preferred.
Theorem 10. If (σ, V ) is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium to the game then there exists a
perfect Bayesian equilibrium (σ, v∗) where v∗ is in pure strategies.
Proof. Let (σ, V ) be an equilibrium. To construct a new strategy profile (µ, v∗), let
X(V ) = {s ∈ Ω : χ(s, V ) = maxP χ} (A.2)
X(V ) = {S ∈ Ω : χ(s, V ) = minP χ} and (A.3)
I(V, s) = {i ∈ N : Vi(s) ∈ (0, 1)} (A.4)
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where P χ is defined as in Lemma 10.Construct (σ, v∗) as follows. For each i ∈ N and s ∈ Ω:
v∗i (s) =


Vi(s) if i 6∈ I(V, s)
1 if i ∈ I(V, s) and s ∈ X(V )
0 if i ∈ I(V, s) and s ∈ X(υ)
1 if i ∈ I(V, s) and s ∈ Ω\(X(V ) ∪X(V ))
(A.5)
Thus, v∗ is in pure strategies. Since Eµs [ωi] = 0 for all i ∈ I(V, s) as demonstrated in the
proof of Lemma 9, no voter strictly prefers to deviate from v∗. Furthermore, by Lemma 10,
σ(s|ω) > 0 implies that ωE ≥ 0 for all s ∈ X(V ), σ(s′|ω) > 0 implies that ωE ≤ 0 for all
s′ ∈ X(V ), and ωE = 0 for all ω such that σ(s′′|ω) > 0 and s′′ ∈ Ω\(X(V ) ∪X(V )). Thus,
if (σ, V ) is an equilibrium, so is (σ, v∗).
Lemma 1 In any equilibrium, either x∗(s|v∗,D) is constant or x∗(s|v∗,D) = 1 only if
ωE ≥ 0 and x∗(s|v∗,D) = 0 only if ωE ≤ 0.
Proof. Consider the strategy profile (σ, v∗) and assume that x∗(s|v∗,D) is not constant. Then
∃s, s′ ∈ Ω such that x∗(s|v∗,D) = 0 and x∗(s′|v∗,D) = 1). Suppose there exists sˆ such that
σ(sˆ|ω) > 0 for some ω such that ωE < 0 and x∗(sˆ|v∗,D) = 0. Then uE(x∗(s|v∗,D), ω) >
uE(x
∗(sˆ|v∗,D), ω) which shows that (σ, v∗) is not an equilbrium. Similarly, suppose there
exists s˜ such that σ(s˜|ω′) > 0 for some ω′ such that ωE > 0 and x∗(sˆ|v∗,D) = 1. Then
uE(x
∗(s′|v∗,D), ω′) > uE(x∗(s˜|v∗,D), ω′) which shows that (σ, v∗) is not an equilbrium.
Lemma 2 If µ0({ω : ωE > 0}) = 1 or µ0({ω : ωE < 0}) = 1 then there does not exist a
D-preferred persuasive equilibrium.
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Proof. By Lemma 11, if x∗(s|v∗,D) is constant for (σ, v∗) then (σ, v∗) is not D-preferred.
Thus, I need to show that if x∗(s|v∗,D) is not constant for (σ, v∗) and µ0({ω : ωE > 0}) = 1
or µ0({ω : ωE < 0}) = 1, then (σ, v∗) is not an equilibrium. Let x∗(s|v∗,D) = 0 and
x∗(s′|v∗,D) = 1 for some s, s′ ∈ Ω such that σ(s|ω)µ0(s) > 0 and σ(s′|ω′)µ0(s′) > 0 for some
ω, ω′ ∈ Ω. If µ0({ω : ωE > 0}) = 1 then uE(s′, ω) > uE(s, ω) which proves that (σ, v∗) is not
an equilibrium. If µ0({ω : ωE < 0}) = 1 then uE(s, ω′) > uE(s′, ω′) which also proves that
(σ, v∗) is not an equilibrium.
Lemma 3 Assume µ0({ω : ωE = 0}) = 0. If a D-preferred equilibrium exists then there
exists C ∈ D such that
Eµ0 [ui(1, ω)|uE(1, ω) > uE(0, ω)] ≥ Eµ0 [ui(0, ω)|uE(1, ω) > uE(0, ω)]
for all i ∈ C and this inequality is strict for some i ∈ C.
Proof. By Lemma 2, if (σ, v∗) is D-preferred then µ0({ω : ωE > 0}) ∈ (0, 1). By Lemma 11,
if x∗(s|v∗,D) is constant for (σ, v∗) then (σ, v∗) is not D-preferred. Thus, by Lemma 1, if
(σ, v∗) is a D-preferred equilibrium then x∗(s|v∗,D) = 1 only if ωE ≥ 0 and x∗(s|v∗,D) = 0
only if ωE ≤ 0. Thus,
U∗i (σ, v
∗) = µ0({ω : ωE > 0})Emu0 [ωi|ωE > 0]. (A.6)
Then
U∗i (σ, v
∗) = µ0({ω : ωE > 0})Emu0 [ωi|ωE > 0] (A.7)
= µ0({ω : ωE > 0})Eµ0 [ui(1, ω)|uE(1, ω) > uE(x0, ω)]. (A.8)
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Since µ0({ω : ωE > 0}) > 0, U∗i (σ, v∗)−Eµ0 [ωi]x0 ≥ 0 if and only if Eµ0 [ui(xc0, ω)|uE(xc0, ω) >
uE(x0, ω)] ≥ 0 and U∗i (σ, v∗) − Eµ0 [ωi]x0 > 0 if and only if Eµ0 [ui(xc0, ω)|uE(xc0, ω) >
uE(x0, ω)] > 0.
Lemma 12. If µ0 ∈ ∆(Ω), {µ1, . . . , µK} ⊂ ∆(Ω) and
∑K
j=1 µj(W ) = µ0(W ) for all W ∈
B(Ω), then there exists a mixed messaging strategy σ such that supp(σ) = {s1, s2, . . . , sK}
and µsj = µj for all j ∈ {1, . . . , K}.
Proof. The result and proof generalize Proposition 1 of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)
but follow a similar logic. Let µ0 ∈ ∆(Ω) and assume that
∑K
j=1 µj(W ) = µ0(W ) for all
W ∈ B(Ω) for {µ1, . . . , µK} ⊂ ∆(Ω). Consider the Lebesgue decomposition of µ0:
µ0 = µ
(ac)
0 + µ
(s)
0 .
where µ
(ac)
0 is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure λ and µ
(s)
0 is
singular. By the Radon-Nikodym theorem, there exists a nonnegative measurable function
f0 on Ω such that for all W ∈ B(Ω):
µ0(W ) =
∫
W
f0dλ. (A.9)
Similarly, for j ∈ {1, . . . , K}, let µj = µ(ac)j + µ(s)j characterize the Lebesgue decomposition
of µj . Since
∑K
j=1 µj(W ) = µ0(W ) for all W ∈ B(Ω), each µj is absolutely continuous
with respect to µ0 and therefore there exists a nonnegative µ0-measurable function such that
µj(W ) =
∫
W
fdµ0 for all W ∈ B(Ω).
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For any ω ∈ supp(µ0), define the following mixed messaging strategy on {s1, . . . , sK}:
σ(sj|ω) =


µj(ω)pj
µ0(ω)
if µ0(ω) > 0
fj(ω)pj
f0(ω)
otherwise.
(A.10)
By Proposition 2 of Macci (1996), the Lebesque decomposition of the posterior measure with
respect to µ0 is characterized as follows:
∫
W
σ(sj|ω)f0(ω)∫
Ω
σ(sj |ω′)dµ0(ω′)dµ0(ω) =
∫
W
fj(ω)pj
f0(ω)
f0(ω)∫
Ω
fj(ω′)pj
f0(ω′)
dµ0(ω′)
dµ0(ω) (A.11)
=
∫
W
fj(ω)pj
pj
∫
Ω
fj(ω′)dµ0(ω′)
dµ0(ω) (A.12)
=
∫
W
fj(ω)dµ0(ω) (A.13)
= µ
(ac)
j (W ) (A.14)
∫
W
σ(sj|ω)µ0(ω)∫
Ω
σ(sj |ω′)dµ0(ω′dµ0(ω) =
∫
W
µj(ω)pj
µ0(ω)
µ0(ω)∫
Ω
µj(ω′)pj
µ0(ω′)
dµ0(ω′)
dµ0(ω) (A.15)
=
∫
W
µj(ω)pj
pj
∫
Ω
µj(ω′)dµ0(ω′)
dµ0(ω) (A.16)
=
∫
W
µj(ω)dµ0(ω) (A.17)
= µ
(s)
j (W ) (A.18)
Thus, since µj = µ
(ac)
j + µ
(s)
j , the strategy σ induces the posterior measures {µj}Kj=1 for each
{sj}Kj=1.
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Lemma 13. Let µ, µ′ ∈ ∆(Ω) and let A ⊆ B for A,B ∈ B(Ω). If δ(µ, µ′) < µ(B)η
η+2
then
∣∣∣∣µ(A)µ(B) − µ
′(A)
µ′(B)
∣∣∣∣ < η.
Proof. Let µ′(A) = µ(A) + ηA and µ
′(B) = µ(B) + ηB. We have
∣∣∣∣u(A)µ(B) − µ
′(A)
µ′(B)
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣µ(A)µ(B) − µ(A) + ηAµ(B) + ηB
∣∣∣∣ (A.19)
=
∣∣∣∣µ(A)ηB − µ(B)ηAµ(B)(µ(B) + ηB)
∣∣∣∣. (A.20)
This absolute value is maximized when ηB is negative and |ηA − ηB| is as large as possible.
Let η = δ(µ, µ′). Thus, we have
∣∣∣∣u(A)µ(B) − µ
′(A)
µ′(B)
∣∣∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣∣−µ(A)η − µ(B)ηµ(B)(µ(B)− η)
∣∣∣∣ (A.21)
=
η(µ(A) + µ(B))
µ(B)(µ(B)− η) (A.22)
<
2µ(B)η
µ(B)(µ(B)− η) (A.23)
=
2η
µ(B)− η . (A.24)
If η < µ(B)η
η+2
, we have
2η
µ(B)− η <
2η
µ(B)− µ(B)η
η+2
(A.25)
=
µ(B)η
η+2
1− η
η+2
(A.26)
=
2η
η
η+2
(η + 2)
(A.27)
= η. (A.28)
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Thus, ∣∣∣∣µ(A)µ(B) − µ
′(A)
µ′(B)
∣∣∣∣ < η.
if δ(µ, µ′) < µ(B)η
η+2
.
Theorem 1 The following statements are equivalent:
1. D is non-collegial.
2. D has a cycle in Ω.
3. There exists a non-empty open set O(D) ∈ ∆(Ω) such that O ⊂M(D).
Proof. I will prove the equivalence of (1) and (2) and then of (1) and (3). The proof that (1)
⇒ (2) closely follows the proof of Theorem 2.4 in Austen-Smith and Banks (2000). Assume
D is non-collegial. Since Ω is a convex set, there exists as set {ω1, . . . , ωn} ⊂ Ω such that
ω11 > ω
2
1 > · · · > ωn1
ω22 > ω
3
2 > · · · > ωn2 > ω12
ω33 > ω
4
3 > · · · > ωn3 > ω13 > ω23
. . .
ωnn > ω
1
n > ω
2
n · · · > ωn−2n > ωn−1n
Since D is non-collegial, for all i ∈ N there exists C ∈ D such that i 6∈ C. For each
element of {ω1, . . . , ωn}, we have {i : ωj−1i > ωji } = N\{j} for all j ∈ N\{1} and {i : ωni >
ω1i } = N\{1}. Since D is proper, we have N\{j} ∈ D for all j ∈ N , which implies that
ωn D ω1 D ω2 D · · · D ωn. Thus, D has a cycle in Ω. To show that (2) ⇒ (1), assume
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that D is collegial. Then there exists i ∈ N such that i ∈ C for all C ∈ D and transitivity
of i’s preferences implies that D does not cycle in Ω.
The proof that (1) implies (3) is by construction. Assume that D is non-collegial. Let
F(D) = {D ⊆ D :
⋂
C∈D
C = ∅ and ∀C ∈ D, C ′ ⊂ C ⇒ C ′ 6∈ D} (A.29)
be the set of all sets of minimal decisive coalitions with an empty intersection. Since D is
non-collegial, F(D) is non-empty. For each D = {C1, . . . , C|D|} ∈ F(D), let
L(D, u+, u−) =
{
L = (µ1, . . . µ|D|+1 ∈ ∆(Ω)|D|+1 : µj({ω : ωE ≥ 0}) = 1∀j ∈ {1, . . . , |D|}
and µ|D|+1({ω : ωE < 0}) = 1
and ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , |D|},Eµj [ωi] ∈
(
0, u+
) ∀i ∈ Cj and Eµj [ωi] < −u−∀i 6∈ Cj
and Eµ|D|+1 [ωi] < 0∀i ∈ N
}
(A.30)
For each L(D) and L = (µ1, . . . , µ|D|+1) ∈ L(D), let
ρ∗(D, u+, u−) =

p ∈ R|D|+1 : minj pj > 0,
|D|+1∑
j=1
pj = 1, and min
j∈{1,...,|D|}
pj >
u+
u+ + u−

 .
(A.31)
The set ρ∗(D, u+, u−) is non-empty provided that u+ < a
|D|+1
and u− > u+(|D| − 1).
Let
O∗(D) =
⋃
D∈F(D)
⋃
u+∈(0, a
|D|−1
)
u−∈(u+(|D|−1),a)
⋃
L∈L(D,u+,u−)
⋃
p∈ρ∗(D,u+,u−)

µ ∈ ∆(Ω) : µ(ω) =
|D|+1∑
j=1
pjµj(ω)∀ω ∈ Ω

 .
(A.32)
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I will show that O∗(D) ⊆M(D) and that O∗(D) is open in (∆(Ω), δ).
To show that O∗(D) ⊆ M(D), let L ∈ LD for some D ∈ F(D) and let p ∈ ρ∗(L). Let
µ∗(W ) =
∑|D|+1
j=1 pjµj(W ) for all W ∈ B(Ω), where L = (µ1, . . . , µ|D|+1). By Lemma 12,
there exists a mixed strategy σ with supp(σ) = {sj}|D|+1j=1 such that µsj = µj for each
j ∈ {1, . . . , |D| + 1}. By definition of ′∗(D), there exists C ∈ D such that Eµsj [ωi] for all
i ∈ C for sj such that σ(sj|ω) > 0 for some ω such that ωE ≥ 0 (i.e. sj for all j ∈ {1, . . . , |D|}.
Furthermore, σ(s|D|+1|ω) = 1 for all ω such that ωE < 0 and Eµs|D|+1 [ωi] < 0 for all i. Thus,
this profile is an equilibrium.
Since D ∈ F(D), for all i ∈ N there exists C ∈ D such that i 6∈ C. Thus, since
minj∈{1,...,|D|} pj >
u+(L)
u+(L)+u−(L)
, for all i ∈ N we have
Eµ∗ [ωi] <
(
1− u
+(L)
u+(L) + u−(L)
)
u+(L)− u
+(L)
u+(L) + u−(L)
u−(L) + p|D|+1E|D|+1[ω)i] (A.33)
<
(
1− u
+(L)
u+(L) + u−(L)
)
u+(L)− u
+(L)
u+(L) + u−(L)
u−(L) (A.34)
= u+(L)− u
+(L)
u+(L) + u−(L)
u+(L)− u−(L) u
+(L)
u+(L) + u−(L)
(A.35)
= u+(L)− u
+(L)
u+(L) + u−(L)
[
u+(L) + u−(L)
]
= 0. (A.36)
Thus, we have x0 = 0 for all µ ∈ O∗(D) and
U∗i (σ
∗, v∗) <
(
1− u
+(L)
u+(L) + u−(L)
)
u+(L)− u
+(L)
u+(L) + u−(L)
u−(L) = 0 (A.37)
which shows that O∗(D) ⊆M(D).
To show that O∗(D) is open, let µ ∈ O(D). I will show that there exists ǫ > 0 such that
if µ′ ∈ ∆(Ω) and δ(µ, µ′) < ǫ then µ′ ∈ O(D). For some D ∈ F(D), let u+ < a
|D|+1
,
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u− > u+(|D| − 1), and let L = (µ1, . . . , µ|D|+1) ∈ L(D, u+, u−) and p = (p1, . . . , p|D|+1) ∈
ρ∗(D, u+, u−) satisfy µ(ω) =
∑|D|+1
j=1 µj(ω)pj.
Let Ω+ = {ω ∈ Ω : ωE ≥ 0} and Ω− = {ω ∈ Ω : ωE < 0}. Consider an arbitrary
µ′ ∈ ∆(Ω). Consider any µ′ ∈ ∆(Ω). Let p′ = (p′, . . . , p′|D|+1) = (p′1, p2, p3, . . . , p|D|, p′|D|+1)
where p′1 = p1+µ
′(Ω+)−µ(Ω+) and p′|D|+1 = p|D|+1+µ′(Ω−)−µ(Ω−). Since µj(Ω+) = 1 for
all j ∈ {1, . . . , |D|} and µ(Ω+) =∑|D|j=1 pjµj(Ω+), it must be the case that ∑|D|j=1 pj = µ(Ω+)
and p|D|+1 = µ(Ω
−). It follows that
|D|∑
j=1
p′j =
|D|∑
j=1
pj + µ
′(Ω+)− µ(Ω+) = µ′(Ω+) (A.38)
and therefore that p′|D|+1 = µ
′(Ω−).
Let L′ = (µ′1, . . . , µ
′
|D|+1) = (µ
′
1, µ2, . . . , µ|D|, µ
′
|D|+1),, where
µ′1(W ) =
µ′(W∩Ω+)
µ′(Ω+)
−∑Dj=2 pjµj(W ∩ Ω+)
p′1
(A.39)
and
µ′|D|+1(W ) =
ω′(W ∩ Ω−)
ω′(Ω−)
(A.40)
for all W ∈ B(Ω).
For any open interval (b, b) with −a < b < b < a and for any i ∈ N , continuity of expected
utility implies that
{µ ∈ ∆(Ω) : Eµ[ωi] ∈ (b, b)} (A.41)
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is an open set. Furthermore, for any C ⊆ N , the set
{µ ∈ ∆(Ω) : Eµ[ωi] ∈ (b, b)∀i}, (A.42)
being a finite intersection of open sets, is also open. Thus, since µ′j(Ω
+) = 1 for all j ∈
{1, . . . , |D|} and µ′|D|+1(Ω−) = 1, there exists η > 0 such that max{δ(µ1, µ′1), δ(µ|D|+1, µ′|D|+1)} <
η and L ∈ L(D, u+, u−) implies that L′ ∈ L(D, u+, u−).
For such an η > 0, let ǫ′ < min{µ(Ω+)p1η
p1η+2
, µ(Ω
−)η
η+2
}. By Lemma 13, if δ(µ, µ′) < ǫ′ then
δ(µ|D|+1, µ
′
|D|+1) < η. Furthermore, for all W ∈ B(Ω+) (the Borel σ-algebra on Ω+), we have
p1µ1(W ) +
|D|∑
j=2
pjµj(W ) =
µ(W )
µ(Ω+)
and (A.43)
p′1µ
′
1(W ) +
|D|∑
j=2
pjµj(W ) =
µ′(W )
µ′(Ω+)
. (A.44)
By Lemma 13, if δ(µ, µ′) < ǫ′ then δ(µ1, µ
′
1) < p1η, so
∣∣p1µ1(W )− p′1µ′1(W )∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣ µ(W )µ(Ω+) − µ(W )µ(Ω+)
∣∣∣∣ < p1η. (A.45)
Thus, we have
∣∣p1µ1(W )− p′1µ′1(W )∣∣ = ∣∣p1(µ1(W )− µ′1(W ))− µ′(W )(µ(Ω+)− µ′(Ω+))∣∣ (A.46)
≤ p1|µ1(W )− µ′1(W )|+ µ′(W )|µ(Ω+)− µ′(Ω+)| (A.47)
< p1η (A.48)
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This implies that
|µ1(W )− µ′1(W )| <
p1η − µ′1(W )|µ(Ω+)− µ′(Ω+)|
p1
<
p1η
p1
= η. (A.49)
Thus, δ(µ, µ′) < ǫ′ implies that δ(µ1, µ
′
1) < η. Finally, since p
′
1 − u
+
u++u−
is a continuous
function and
(
0, u
+
u++u−
)
is an open interval, there exists ǫ′′ such that if p1 ∈
(
0, u
+
u++u−
)
then
(p1 − ǫ′′, p1 + ǫ′′) ⊂
(
0, u
+
u++u−
)
. Since p′1 = p1 + µ
′(Ω+)− µ(Ω+), we have p′ ∈ ρ∗(D, u+, u−)
if p ∈ ρ∗(D, u+, u−) and δ(µ, µ′) < ǫ′′. Combining these facts, if δ(µ, µ′) < min{ǫ′, ǫ′′} and
L ∈ L(D, u+, u−) and p ∈ ρ∗(D, u+, u−), then L′ ∈ L(D, u+, u−) and p′ ∈ ρ∗(D, u+, u−).
Thus, if δ(µ, µ′) < min{ǫ′, ǫ′′} and µ ∈ O(D) then µ′ ∈ O(D).
Finally, to show that (3) implies (1), assume that D is collegial. Then there exists i ∈ N
such that i ∈ C for all C ∈ D. Thus, x∗(s|v∗,D) = 1 if Eµs [ωi] > 0. This implies that
U∗i (σ, v∗) ≥ 0 in any equilibrium.
Theorem 2 If D is more resolute than D′, then M(D′) ⊆M(D).
Proof. Assume thatD is more resolute thanD′ and µ ∈M(D). Thus, there exists (σ, v∗) such
that (σ, v∗) ∈ S(µ,D) and U∗i (σ, v∗) < Eµ[ωi]x0 for all i ∈ N . Thus, for each s ∈ supp(σ),
x∗(s|v∗,D) = 1 implies that there exists some C ∈ D such that Eµs [ωi] ≥ 0 for all i ∈ C.
Since D is more resolute than D′, C ∈ D′, so we have x∗(s|vˆ,D′) = 1 in some equilibrium
(σ, vˆ) ∈ S(µ,D′). This proves that M(D′) ⊆M(D).
Theorem 3 Assume that n is odd and let Dm = {C ⊂ N : |C| > n
2
}. Fix a vector
z = (z1, . . . , zn) ∈ Rn and for some q ∈ R let
Θ(q) = {ω ∈ Ω : ∃θ ∈ R s.t. ωi = (zi − q)2 − (zi − θ)2∀i ∈ N}.
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If µ0(Θ(q)) = 1, then all persuasive equilibria are majority preferred.
Proof. Let z be the median of (z1, . . . , zn) and let i be the index of the voter with zi = z.
Since the number of voters is odd, z is preferred to all points in Θ(q). Banks and Duggan
(2006) show that, if voters’ utility functions are quadratic and there exists a core point at a
voter’s ideal point, then the core voter is decisive over lotteries. That is, for all µ ∈ ∆(Ω),
{i ∈ N : Eµ[ωi] ≥ 0} ∈ Dm if and only if Eµ[ωi] ≥ 0}. Thus, since proposals only pass
if Eµs [ωi] > 0, it must be the case that U
∗
i
(σ, v∗) ≥ x0Eµ0 [ωi] if (σ, v∗) is a persuasive
equilibrium. Furthermore, by the result of Banks and Duggan, this implies that {i ∈ N :
U∗i (σ, v
∗) ≥ x0Eµ0 [ωi]} ∈ Dm.
A.2 Expected Utility Calculations for Example 2
Let υi(x, θ) = (zi1− θ1)2+ (zi2− θ2)2, so that ωi = z2i1+ z2i2− υi(x, θ). Since ω is a quadratic
function of θ, we have
Eµ[υi(x, θ)] = (zi1 − Eµ[θ1])2 + (zi2 − Eµ[θ2])2 +Varµ[θ1] + Varµ[θ2]. (A.50)
Let µ0 be the prior distribution as usual, and let {µj}3j=1 be the posterior beliefs resulting
from each signal. The expectation and variance of these distributions are as follows.
Eµ0 [θ1] =
1
2π
∫ 1
0
∫ 2pi
0
r cosφdφdr = 0 (A.51)
Eµ0 [θ2] =
1
2π
∫ 1
0
∫ 2pi
0
r sin φdφdr = 0 (A.52)
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Varµ0 [θ1] =
1
2π
∫ 1
0
∫ 2pi
0
(r cosφ)2dφdr =
1
6
(A.53)
Varµ0 [θ2] =
1
2π
∫ 1
0
∫ 2pi
0
(r sinφ)2dφdr =
1
6
(A.54)
Eµ1 [θ1] =
3
2π
∫ 1
0
∫ 2
3
pi
0
r cos φdφdr =
3
√
3
8π
(A.55)
Eµ1 [θ2] =
3
2π
∫ 1
0
∫ 2
3
pi
0
r sin φdφdr =
9
8π
(A.56)
Varµ1 [θ1] =
3
2π
∫ 1
0
∫ 2
3
pi
0
(r cosφ− 3
√
3
8π
)2dφdr =
1
6
− 27
64π2
−
√
3
16π
(A.57)
Varµ1 [θ2] =
3
2π
∫ 1
0
∫ 2
3
pi
0
(r sinφ− 9
8π
)2dφdr =
1
6
− 81
64π2
−
√
3
16π
(A.58)
Eµ2 [θ1] =
3
2π
∫ 1
0
∫ 4
3
pi
2
3
pi
r cos φdφdr = −3
√
3
4π
(A.59)
Eµ2 [θ2] =
3
2π
∫ 1
0
∫ 4
3
pi
2
3
pi
r sin φdφdr = 0 (A.60)
Varµ2 [θ1] =
3
2π
∫ 1
0
∫ 4
3
pi
2
3
pi
(r cosφ+
3
√
3
4π
)2dφdr =
1
6
− 27
16π2
−
√
3
8π
(A.61)
Varµ2 [θ2] =
3
2π
∫ 1
0
∫ 4
3
pi
2
3
pi
(r sinφ)2dφdr =
1
6
−
√
3
8π
(A.62)
Eµ0 [θ1] =
3
2π
∫ 1
0
∫ 2pi
4
3
pi
r cosφdφdr =
3
√
3
8π
(A.63)
Eµ0 [θ2] =
3
2π
∫ 1
0
∫ 2pi
4
3
pi
r sin φdφdr = − 9
8π
(A.64)
Varµ0 [θ1] =
3
2π
∫ 1
0
∫ 2pi
4
3
pi
(r cosφ− 3
√
3
8π
)2dφdr =
1
6
− 27
64π2
−
√
3
16π
(A.65)
Varµ0 [θ2] =
3
2π
∫ 1
0
∫ 2pi
4
3
pi
(r sinφ+
9
8π
)2dφdr =
1
6
− 81
64π2
−
√
3
16π
(A.66)
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Plugging these values into Equation A.50 gives us the expected values of υi(x, θ) for each
voter.
Eµ1 [υi(x, θ)] =
1
3
+
(
zi2 − 9
8π
)2
+
(
zi1 − 3
√
3
8π
)2
− 27
16π2
(A.67)
Eµ2 [υi(x, θ)] =
1
3
+ z2i2 +
(
zi1 +
3
√
3
4π
)2
− 27
16π2
(A.68)
Eµ3 [υi(x, θ)] =
1
3
+
(
zi2 +
9
8π
)2
+
(
zi1 − 3
√
3
8π
)2
− 27
16π2
(A.69)
Substituting the ideal points from Table 2.2 for zi1 and zi2 and subtracting the result from
z2i1 + z
2
i2 gives the payoffs in Table 2.3.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 3
B.1 Proofs of results
Lemma 4 In any equilibrium to the game, x∗(M1,M2) is constant.
Proof. Assume there is some strategy profile (σ1, σ2) such that x
∗(M1,M2) = 0 and x
∗(M ′1,M
′
2) =
1 for some pairs of lobbying choices. I must show that this strategy profile is not an equilib-
rium. If here exists M ′′2 such that x
∗(M ′1,M
′′
2 ) = 0, then M
′′
2 is a strictly better response to
M ′1 than M
′
2 for any W , which implies that (σ1, σ2) is not an equilibrium. If there does not
exist such a M ′′2 , then x
∗(M ′1, M˜) = 1 for all M˜ ∈ 2N . In particular, M ′1 gives G1 a strictly
higher expected payoff than M1, which also implies that (σ1, σ2) is not an equilibrium.
Lemma 5 In any equilibrium to the game with or without competition, following some
M1,M2 ∈ 2N , we have
Upii (M1,M2) ≤ H
n∑
k=0
pkmin
{
k
q
, 1
}
− L(1−
n∑
k=0
pkmin
{
k
q
, 1
}
)
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for at least n− q legislators.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Assume there is an equilibrium in which Upii (M1,M2) >
H
∑n
k=0 pkmin
{
k
q
, 1
}
− L(1 −∑nk=0 pkmin{kq , 1}) for at least q legislators following any
pair of lobbying choices. Thus, there must be at least q legislators such that Πi(M1, ∅) >∑n
k=0 pkmin
{
k
q
, 1
}
for each M1 in the support of σ1. Since Pr[|W | ≥ q|M1,M2] ≤
∑n
k=q pk
for some (M1,M2), this implies that, for some k ∈ {0, . . . , q − 1}, we have Πi(M1, ∅||W | =
k) > k
q
. Number these q legislators as {1, . . . , q}. Since Π1(M1, ∅||W | = k) > kq , we have
Pr[W ⊂ {2, . . . , q}|M1, ∅, |W | = k] < q − k
q
.
Similarly, since Π2(M1, ∅||W | = k) > kq , we have
Pr[W ⊂ {1, 3, . . . , q|M1, ∅, |W | = k}] < q − k
q
.
In fact, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , q − 1}, we have
Pr[W ⊂ {1, . . . , q}\{i}|M1, ∅, |W | = k] < q − k
q
.
Let
Q(i) =
{
W ∈ 2N : |W | = k, {q} ∪ {1, . . . , i} ⊆W ∧ i 6∈ W} .
We have
Pr[q ∈ W |M1, ∅, |W | = k] =
∑
W :|W |=k∧q∈W
π(W |M1, ∅, |W | = k) (B.1)
=
k−1∑
i=1
π(Q(i)|M1, ∅, |W | = k) (B.2)
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<
k−1∑
i=1
q − k
q
(B.3)
=
(k − 1)(q − k)
q
(B.4)
<
k
q
. (B.5)
This contradicts the statement that Πi(M1, ∅||W | = k) > kq for all i ∈ {1, . . . , q}. Thus, such
an equilibrium cannot exist.
Lemma 6 If G2 never lobbies and G1 uses the strategy σ
min
1 , for each M1 such that |M1| = q,
we have
Upii (M1, ∅) = H
n∑
k=0
pkmin
{
k
q
, 1
}
− L(1−
n∑
k=0
pkmin
{
k
q
, 1
}
)
for all q of the legislators in M1.
Proof. Let σ2(∅|W,M1) = 1 for all W and M1 and let σ1 = σmin1 . For each M1 such that
|M1| = q and each W ∈ 2N , we have
π(W |M1) =


(
n−|W |
q−|W |
)−1
if W ⊆M1(
|W |
q
)−1
if W ⊃M1
0 otherwise.
Therefore, the posterior distribution conditional on the size of the set of beneficiaries is
π(W |M1, |W | = k) =


(
q
k
)−1
if k < q and W ⊂M1
1 if q ≥ k and W ⊃M1
0 otherwise.
107
Hence, if |W | = k for k ∈ {0, . . . , q− 1}, the probability that i ∈ W given i ∈M1 is equal to
Πi(M1, ∅||W | = k) =
∑
W ′:i∈W ′∧|W ′|=k
(
q
k
)−1
(B.6)
=
(
q − 1
k − 1
)(
q
k
)−1
k
q
. (B.7)
Thus, the total probability that i ∈ W given i ∈M1 is equal to
Πi(M1, ∅) =
q−1∑
k=0
k
q
+
n∑
k=q
1 (B.8)
=
n∑
k=0
min{k
q
, 1}. (B.9)
Thus,
Upii (M1, ∅) = H
n∑
k=0
pkmin
{
k
q
, 1
}
− L(1−
n∑
k=0
pkmin
{
k
q
, 1
}
)
for all i ∈M1 for each M1 such that
∑
W∈2N σ1(M1|W ) > 0. Since |M1| = q for all such M1
given σmin1 , this completes the proof.
Theorem 5 When there is no competition, G1 is influential if and only if
H
L
≥ κ1(p, q).
Proof. The legislator decision rule in Equation 3.5 implies that each legislator will vote in
favor of passage if and only if H
L
≥ 1−Πi(M1,∅)
Πi(M1,∅)
. Lemma 6 implies that 1−Πi(M1,∅)
Πi(M1,∅)
= κ1(p, q)
for all i ∈ M1. Thus, if G1 plays a minimal strategy then the policy is implemented if and
only if H
L
≥ κ1(p, q). G1 has no incentive to deviate from this strategy since the policy is
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implemented following any message, so this is an equilibrium. Furthermore, Lemma 5 implies
that there is no pair of messages for which 1−Πi(M1,∅)
Πi(M1,∅)
< κ1(p, q), which implies that there is
no strategy to support an influential equilibrium if H
L
< κ1(p, q). Thus, G1 is influential if
and only if H
L
≥ κ1(p, q).
Lemma 7. G2 blocks the strategy σ1 if there exists someM1 and σ2 such that
∑
W∈2N σ1(M1|W ) >
0 and x∗(M1,M2) = 0 for all M2 such that
∑
W∈2N σ2(M2|M1,W ) > 0.
Proof. Consider a particular σ1 and let
M(σ1) =
{
M1 :
∑
W∈2N
σ1(M1|W ) > 0 and ∃σ2 s.t. x∗(M1,M2) = 0∀M2 s.t.
∑
W∈2N
σ2(M2|M1,W ) > 0
}
.
Assume that M is non-empty and for each M˜ ∈ M let σM˜2 be some strategy that prevents
passage of the policy whenM1 = M˜ . IfM(σ1) = supp(σ1) then the strategy σ′2(M2|W,M1) =
σM12 (M2|W,M1) prevents passage following all messages, so G2 blocks σ1 and we are done.
Otherwise, let M⊂ supp(σ1) and define the strategy σ′′2 as follows:
σ′′2(M2|W,M1) =


σM12 (M2|W,M1) if M1 ∈M
1 if M2 = ∅ and M1 6∈ M
0 otherwise.
This strategy is a best response when
π(W |M1,M2) = p(W )σ(M1|W )∑
W ′∈2N p(W
′)σ(M1|W ′)
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for all M1 ∈ supp(σ1)\M and M2 6= ∅, which is consistent with Bayes rule given these
lobbying strategies, and by definition of M and σ′′2 this implies that x∗(M1,M2) = 0 for
all M1 ∈ M and M2 sent with positive probability following M1 and x∗(M1, ∅) = 1 for all
M1 ∈ supp(σ1)\M. Thus, G1 strictly prefers to deviate to a strategy that places positive
probability only on lobbying choices not in M. This shows that G2 blocks the strategy
σ1.
Lemma 8. For any lobbying strategy by G1, there is a strategy for G2 such that for any
(M1,M2) on the equilibrium path U
pi
i (M1,M2) ≤ H
∑n
k=q pk − L
∑q−1
k=0 pk for at least n − q
legislators.
Proof. Let
τ(M1,M2|σ1, σ2) =
∑
W∈2N
σ1(M1|W )σ2(M2|W,M1)
denote the total probability of the lobbying choices M1 and M2. The laws of probability
require that ∑
2N×2N
τ(M1,M2|σ1, σ2)π(W |M1,M2) = p(W )
for all W ∈ 2N . This implies that
∑
W :|W |≥
∑
2N×2N
τ(M1,M2|σ1, σ2)π(W |M1,M2) =
∑
2N×2N
τ(M1,M2|σ1, σ2) Pr[|W | ≥ q|M1,M2]
=
n∑
k=q
pk. (B.10)
Consider a strategy σ2 such that σ2(M2|W,M1) = 0 when |W | < q and M2 ∩ W 6= ∅.
Furthermore, assume σ2 only places positive probability on sets of size n − q. For such a
strategy, the probability that i ∈ M2 is equal to zero if i ∈ W and |W | < q. Thus, for all
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i ∈M2:
Πi(M1,M2) = Πi(M1,M2||W | < q) Pr[|W | < q|M1,M2] + Πi(M1,M2||W | < q) Pr[|W | < q|M1,M2]
(B.11)
= 0 + Πi(M1,M2||W | < q) Pr[|W | < q|M1,M2]. (B.12)
If Pr[|W | < q|M1,M2] =
∑q−1
k=0 for all (M1,M2) such that τ(M1,M2|σ1, σ2) > 0 then
Upii (M1,M2) = H
∑n
k=q pk − L
∑q−1
k=0 pk for all n − q legislators in M2 and the proof is
complete. Otherwise, Equation B.10 implies that Pr[|W | < q|M1,M2] <
∑q−1
k=0 for some
(M1,M2) such that τ(M1,M2|σ1, σ2) > 0. Therefore, Upii (M1,M2) < H
∑n
k=q pk −L
∑q−1
k=0 pk
for all n− q legislators in M2. Thus, for any σ1, there exists a σ2 such that Upii (M1,M2) ≤
H
∑n
k=q pk − L
∑q−1
k=0 pk for at least n − q legislators for any (M1,M2) on the equilibrium
path.
Theorem 6. There is a blocking equilibrium if
κ1(p, q) ≤ H
L
< κ2(p, q).
Proof. Let κ1(p, q) ≤ H
L
< κ2(p, q). By Theorem 5 there is an influential equilibrium when
there is no competition. Furthermore, by Lemma 8 and the legislator decision rule in Equa-
tion 3.5, for every σ1 there is some σ2 such that x ∗ (M1,M2) = 0 for some M1 such that∑
W∈2N σ1(M1|W ) > 0 and all M2 such that
∑
W∈2N σ2(M2|W,M1) > 0. By Lemma 7, this
implies that G2 blocks every lobbying strategy by G1, which shows that there is a blocking
equilibrium.
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Theorem 7. There exists an influential equilibrium in the presence of interest group com-
petition if
H
L
≥ κ2(p, q).
Proof. Let σ1 = σ
min
2 . Then Πi(M1,M2||W | ≥ q) = 1 for all i ∈ M1 given any M2 for any
σ2. Thus,
Πi(M1,M2) = Πi(M1,M2||W | < q)
q−1∑
k=0
pk+Πi(M1,M2||W | ≥ q)
n∑
k=q
pk ≥ H
n∑
k=q
pk−L
q−1∑
k=0
pk.
This implies that x∗(M1,M2) = 1 for allM2 and allM1 such that
∑
W∈2N σ1(M1|W ) > 0.
Theorem 4. Any influential equilibrium gives at least legislators a lower ex ante expected
utility relative to the outcome when lobbying is not allowed.
Proof. By Lemma 4, in an influential equilibrium x∗(M1,M2) = 1 for all M1,M2. Thus,
in an influential equilibrium, the policy is passed with probability one. By assumption,∑
W∈2N p(W )ui(1,W ) < 0 for at least q legislators since the policy, since the legislators
would not pass the policy in the absence of lobbying. Therefore, at least q legislators get a
negative ex ante expected utility from an influential equilibrium.
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 4
C.1 Proofs of Results
Theorem 8 There exists a directional communication equilibrium if Σ = kId where k > 0
is a constant scalar and Id is the identity matrix.
Proof. If Σ = kId then z
′Σz = k||z||2 for all z ∈ Rd. Thus, we can write f(z) = f ∗(||z||)
where the domain of f ∗(||z||) is R+. Let for any z and z˜, let θ(z, z˜) be the angle enclosed by
the two vectors.
By the law of cosines,
||z− z˜||2 = ||z||2 + ||z˜||2 − 2||z||||z˜|| cos θ(z, z˜). (C.1)
Thus, the expected utility to voter i from electing a candidate j ∈ {A,B} using the direc-
tional communication strategy who sends the message m is
−E[||zi − z|| |m] = −
∫ ∞
0
[||z||2 + r2 − 2||z||r cos θ(zi,m)] dr (C.2)
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= −||zi||2 −
∫ ∞
0
r2f ∗(r)dr + 2||zi|| cos θ(zi,m)
∫ ∞
0
r2f ∗(r)dr. (C.3)
Therefore, if A and B sendmA andmB respectively and both use directional communications
strategies, i strictly prefers A to B if and only if
−||zi||2 −
∫ ∞
0
r2f ∗(r)dr+2||zi|| cos θ(zi,mA)
∫ ∞
0
r2f ∗(r)dr (C.4)
> −||zi||2 −
∫ ∞
0
r2f ∗(r)dr + 2||zi|| cos θ(zi,mB)
∫ ∞
0
r2f ∗(r)dr
2||zi|| cos θ(zi,mA) > 2||zi|| cos θ(zi,mB) (C.5)
cos θ(zi,mA) > cos θ(zi,mB). (C.6)
Since cos θ(zi,m) =
zi·m
||zi||||m||
= zi·m
||zi||
by the definition of the dot product and the fact that
||m|| = 1, we have cos θ(zi,mA) > cos θ(zi,mB) if and only if zi · (mA−mB) > 0. Thus, the
set of zi satisfying this condition defines an open halfspace with (0, . . . , 0) on the boundary.
By the assumption that G is angularly symmetric, this implies that each voter strictly
prefers A to B with probability 1
2
and, by symmetry, strictly prefers B to A with the same
probability. Furthermore, since this holds for any two messages, neither candidate has a
strict incentive to deviate from the directional communication strategy.
Theorem 9 There exists a principal orthant equilibrium.
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Proof. Let y = Qz = (y1, . . . , yd). Since Σ is a symmetric real matrix, Q is an orthogonal
matrix, meaning that Q′Q = Id. Some algebraic manipulation shows that
f(y) = f(Qz) = c · f0(z′Q′QΛ−1Q−1Qz) = c · f0(z′Λ−1z). (C.7)
Since Λ−1 is a diagonal matrix, this implies that the dimensions of Qz are distributed
independently and we can write
f(y) =
d∏
j=1
fj(yj) (C.8)
where fj is the marginal density of yj. Furthermore, since f(y) = f(−y), we have
∫ 0
−∞
fj(yj)dyj =∫∞
0
fj(yj)dyj =
1
2
and
∫ 0
−∞
y2j fj(yj)dyj =
∫∞
0
y2jfj(yj)dyj for all j. The latter implies that
E[||z||2|m] = E[||z||2|m˜] and Var[z|m] = Var[z|m˜] if S(m) and S(m˜) are both principal
orthants of Rd with respect to f .
Let E[||z||2|m] = z and Var[z|m] = V and let s(m) and s(m˜) be the (vector-valued) means
of S(m) and S(m˜), respectively. The mean-variance representation of quadratic expected
utility implies that E[u(zA, zi)|mA = m] > E[u(zB, zi)|mB = m˜] if and only if
−||zi − s(m)|| − V > −||zi − s(m˜)|| − V (C.9)
−||zi|2 − z2 + 2zi · s(m)− V > −||zi|2 − z2 + 2zi · s(m˜)− V (C.10)
2zi · s(m) > 2zi · s(m˜) (C.11)
zi · (s(m)− s(m˜)) > 0. (C.12)
The set of zi satisfying this condition defines an open halfspace with (0, . . . , 0) on the bound-
ary. Since G is angularly symmetric, this implies that each candidate expects to gain any
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voter’s support with probability 1
2
. Since this holds for any pair of principal orthans, no
candidate has a strict incentive to deviate from this strategy.
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